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The main theme of this theses is to assess Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem and also analyze electoral systems in terms
of Arrow's conditions and axioms.
Arrow's five conditions and two axioms are:
1. Unrestricted Domain:
Every logically possible set of ordering of alternatives are
admissible as choices for individuals.
2. Positive Association of Individual and Social Values:
The social ordering should respond positively to
alternatives in individual orderings, or at least not
negatively.
3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:
The social ordering shall not be altered by the presence or
absence of an irrelevant alternatives in the set of
alternatives.
4. Citizen's Sovereignty:
A social choice should be permitted with reference to the
unanimity of all the individuals in the society.
5. Nondictatorship:
A social ordering should not be imposed by a dictator of the
society, irrespective to the preference of the rest of the
society.
Axiom I: Connectivity
For all x and y, either xRy or yRx.
Axiom II: Transitivity
For all x, y and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz.
Arrow claims that these conditions and axioms are the
necessary conditions for a social choice mechanism to be
rational. However, they cannot simultaneously be fulfilled.
This thesis divides into four sections. In section I,
Arrow's conditions are presented and a formal proof of the
Impossibility Theorem are also provided.
In section II, various conditions and axioms that Arrow
imposes on a social welfare function are being critically
assessed. It is concluded that Arrow's impossibility result can
be avoided by restriction on the Condition of Unrestricted
Domain. The cardinal utility scale does not violate the Condition
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Moreover, it is
possible to apply the cardinal utility scale meaningfully in some
situations. Pareto Principle is a necessary condition for a
social choice mechanism, but unanimity rule is not. Infringement
of the Nondictatorship Condition is problematic since a choice
which is derived from a single individual can hardly be called a
social choice at all. The Axiom of transitivity can be derived
from the Axiom of connectivity. Moreover, Arrow's requirement of
transitivity may not be a necessary condition for collective
choice procedures. The violation of the social transitivity can
be justified by the populistic democractic theory.
In section III, Arrow's conditions are reformulated and
general survey of electoral systems is performed.
In the final section, six major types of electoral systems
are analyzed in terms of Arrow's conditions to see which
conditions do these systems violate. The analysis of electoral
systems are based on the reformulated version of Arrow's
conditions. It has found that among the six major types of
electoral systems: the plurality systems, two-ballot system,
alternative vote system, single non-transferable vote system,
list systems and the single transferable vote system. All of
them violate the condition of consistency. The single
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INTRODUCTION
Kenneth J. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a theorem on
social choice. According to A. F. Mackay's description, a social
choice situation consists of some choosers, some choice
alternatives, some information about the chooser's preferences
over the choice alternatives, and an aggregation device that
combines the preferences of individuals into a collective
choice.
The theory of social choice is to study aggregation devices
to see whether there is a perfect, rational, fair or acceptable
design for the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a
social choice. However, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that
given certain 'reasonable' assumptions, there can be no ideally
rational aggregation device.
Arrow proves that it is logically impossible to construct a
'reasonable social choice function'. It means that all electoral
systems used in our daily life is not a 'rational aggregation
device'. Hence, there is no method of voting which will remove
the paradox of voting..., neither plurality voting nor any scheme
of proportional representation, no matter how complicated.
Similarly, the market mechanism does not create a rational social
The plausibility of the theorem, to a large extent, depends
on what is meant by 'rational'. In Arrow's conception of
rationality, a rational social choice procedure (which Arrow
termed it as a social welfare function) should be able to
aggregate individuals' orderings of alternatives into a social
orderings. By a social welfare function will be meant a process
or rule which, for each set of individual orderings Rj,...,
Rn for alternative social states (one ordering for each
choice.
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individual), states a corresponding social ordering of
alternative social states, R.
The individual preference orderings are the only raw
material for inputting into the social welfare function to yield
a social choice.
Arrow has said, it will be assumed that individuals are
rational, by which is meant that the ordering relation R
satisfy Axioms I and II. The problem will be to construct an
ordering relation for society as a whole that will also reflect
rational choice-making so that R may also be assumed to satisfy
Axiom I and II.
Hence, a social choice and an individual choice possesses
the same essence of rationality.
The necessary condition for a social choice to be rational
is to satisfy both Axiom I and II listed in the following:
Axiom I: Connectivity
For all x and y, either xRy or yRx.
Axiom II: Transitivity
For all x, y and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz.j-j
(Where the variables x,y and z stand for the alternatives.
The relation, R, stand for 'is preferred or indifferent to'
In addition to the two axioms, Arrow imposes five conditions
on the social welfare function, which he claims to be apparently
reasonable conditions for the design of any rational aggregation
These five conditions are:
1. Unrestricted Domain:
Every logically possible set of ordering of alternatives are
admissible as choices for individuals.
device.
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2. Positive Association of Individual and Social Values:
The social ordering should respond positively to
alternatives in individual orderings, or at least not
negatively.
3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:
The social ordering shall not be altered by the presence or
absence of an irrelevant alternatives in the set of
alternatives.
4. Citizen's Sovereignty:
A social choice should be permitted with reference to the
unanimity of all the individuals in the society.
5. Nondictatorship:
A social ordering should not be imposed by a dictator of the
society, irrespective to the preference of the rest of the
society.
Arrow argues that the above two axioms and the five
conditions are the elementary requirements for an aggregation
mechanism to fulfill in order to be a rational device. However,
Arrow also shows that the two ordering axioms and the five
conditions are inconsistent. This important result is known as
the 'Arrow's Impossibility Theorem'. The theorem says that no
collective choice mechanism can always satisfy these conditions
simultaneously.
The problem of social choice, is to define a 'reasonable'
method to aggregate individuals' preference to generate a single
preference pattern for the society composed of these individuals.
Arrow's finding, however, gives a negative answer to the problem.
By implication, there are no social choice mechanisms are not
fundamentally flawed.
Electoral systems are the major social choice mechanism used
in democratic countries to settle political affairs. If Arrow's
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theorem holds, all electoral systems must violate at least one of
Arrow's conditions. This is the challenge presented by Arrow that
there is no such thing as a flawless electoral system for
choosing one of three or more candidates.
In democratic countries worldwide, there are five main types
of electoral systems currently practised: the plurality systems,
majority systems, semi-proportional systems, list proportional
representation systems and single transferable vote system. What
conditions do these electoral systems violate? Is the
infringement of Arrow's conditions justifiable? These questions
will be tackled later in this thesis.
In the first place, I shall present the 'innocuous'
conditions which Arrow thinks that all reasonable individuals
would agree. Moreover, I also present a proof for the
Impossibility Theorem in the section I. Arrow's original proof
and conditions contained certain flaws which were subsequently
revised in the second edition of his Social Choice and Individual
Values. However, his revised proof seems incomplete (he only
proof the theorem for three alternatives, moreover, some steps
for the proof are omitted), therefore, the proof given in
chapter 2 is a modification of his formulation.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a logical conclusion, not
the result of empirical observation, instead, it is the result of
the logical deduction from a set of premises (i.e. the five
conditions and two axioms mentioned above). An analysis of the
formal proof, which is now commonly accepted as correct, shows
that this Theorem does derive from his conditions. Therefore, the
assessment of the Theorem will only concentrate on Arrow's
conditions. A sound argument should fulfill two requirements.
First, it must be formally valid. Second, its premises must be
justified. Since the Impossibility Theorem is formally valid,
the last hope for us to overcome Arrow's challenge is to
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'discover' a condition which is not a necessary requirement for a
social choice mechanism. Thus, in section II, Arrow's conditions
and axioms will be critically assessed.
In section III, Arrow's conditions are reformulated and
general survey of electoral systems is performed. These are
preparations for section IV.
In the final section, various types of electoral systems
will be analyzed in terms of Arrow's conditions to see which
conditions do these systems violate. The findings, will be
summarized and interpreted in the conclusion.
SECTION I
ARROW'S CONDITIONS AND HIS IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
THE CONDITIONS OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY
THEOREM
PROOF OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Notation for Preferences and choice -6- Chapter One
CHAPTER ONE
THE CONDITIONS OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
1.1 A Notation for Preferences and Choice
Since 'social choice' is concerned with human preferences
among alternatives, We first postulate a set of choosers,
M:(1, 2, 3,..., M); a set of alternatives, A:(x, y, z,...).
We also postulate that the choosers are able to make an
ordering relation, R on the alternatives. R stands for
'preference or indifference'. It allows a chooser to say whether
he prefers x to y or is indifferent between them. The relation R,
may be thought of the combination of preference, P and
indifference, I. In the area of choice, the relation R, is the
analogue of the relation of greater than or equal to in the area
of numerical comparison; P, the relation of preference, is the
analogue of greater than; and the relation of indifference I, is
the analogue of equal to.
Now we postulate two Axioms, which Arrow argues to be the
necessary conditions for a choice to be rational. These are the
notions of rationality.
Axiom I: For all x and y, either xRy or yRx.
This is the axiom of connectivity that guarantees
comparability between members of every pair of alternatives.
[F]or any pair of alternatives x and y, either x is preferred to
y or y to x, or the two are indifferent. That is, we have assumed
that any two alternatives are comparable.
The axiom does not exclude the possibility of both xRy and
yRx holds since x and y may be indifferent.
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Axiom II: For all x, y and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz.
This is the axiom of transitivity. It states that an
individual prefers alternative x to y, and y to z, then that
individual should prefer x to z; otherwise, he is irrational. The
notion of transitivity is the analogue of a mathematical relation
which applies to numbers. In the set of real numbers, if one
number is greater than a second number, and the second number is
greater than a third number, then the first number is greater
than the third. Putting it in symbols, for a, b, c are elements
of real number, we have the relation:
If ab, and bc;
then ac.
This is the law of transitvity in inequality.
Arrow claims that this logical properties of inequality
still holds in the choice action of a rational individual.
Together Axiom I and II, guarantee an individual is able to rank
alternatives in a complete order. In fact, arrow calls the axioms
as the requirements of collective rationality and may be taken as
the definition of rationality in collective choice. [T]he
consequences of the assumption of rationality is that the choice
to be made from any set of alternatives can be determined by the
choice made between pairs of alternatives.'
Furthermore, Arrow imposes five conditions on the
construction of a social welfare function- an aggregation device
for the conversion of individual preferences to a social choice.
Condition I: Unrestricted Domain
All logically possible orderings of the alternative social
states are admissible.
The condition means that there is no restriction on an
individual in the ordering of his preferences. One would wish to
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express whatever preferences he has. If there is any restriction,
one may be deprived from his genuine preferences. Thus, it is
unreasonable to impose any limitations to the choices of
individuals.
In political philosophy, this might have been called freedom
of choice. This condition applies not only to individual, but
also to the collective choice. For n alternatives, there will be
n! (that is, Ix2x3x.. .xn) ways in which the n elements can be
ordered. If there are three alternatives, say x, y, z, then there
are 3! (1x2x3) possible ways of ordering:
(1) xRy, yRz, and xRz (by transitivity)
(2) xRz, zRy, and xRy (by transitivity)
(3) yRx, xRz, and yRz (by transitivity)
(4) yRz, zRx, and yRx (by transitivity)
(5) zRx, xRy, and zRy (by transitivity)
(6) zRy, yRx, and zRx (by transitivity)
Condition II: Positive Association of Individual and Social
Values
For a given pair of alternatives, x and y, let the individual
preferences be given. Suppose that x is then raised in some or
all of the individual preferences. Then if x was originally
socially preferred to y, it remains socially preferred to y after
the change.
This condition is to assure some positive association
between individual preference and social choice.
Arrow gives a justification for this condition: Since we
are trying to describe social welfare and not some sort of
illfare, we must assume that the social welfare function is such
that the social ordering responds positively to alterations in
individual values, or at least not negatively.
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Supposing there were three alternatives, x, y and z, and the
society order, xRy. Now if individuals either raise x in their
preference order or do not change its position, we have no reason
to lower x from the social ordering. This is a natural
requirement since no individual ranks x lower than he formerly
did; if society formerly ranked x above y, we should certainly
expected that it still does.
Condition III: The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Let R-jy..., Rh and R-1,..., Rn' be two sets of
individual orderings and let C(S) and C'(S) be the corresponding
social choice functions. If, for all individuals i and all x and
y in a given environment S, xRy if and only if xR'y, then
C(S) and C'(S) are the same.
This means that if the set of individual preferences on
which a social choice function is based does not change (i.e.
xRy=xR'y), then the social choice function should remain
the same. (i.e. C(S)=C'(S))
The condition imposes certain constraints on the input that
an acceptable aggregation device can respond to.
First, the social welfare function should respond only to
preference orderings of individuals. This means that the
aggregation device should respond only to information concerning
what is preferred, and what is indifferent. It should not respond
to the intensity of the preference nor other type of information.
We can see that Arrow is an 'ordinalist in the sense that he
does not believe the intensity of preference can be expressed
quantitatively by numerical terms in a meaningful way. Only
ordinal rankings are acceptable among alternatives.
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Second, an aggregation device should respond to a restricted
class of alternatives. Only those alternatives involved in social
orderings are taken into consideration. Thus, if an alternative
does not belong to the restricted class, the presence or absence
of such an alternative should not alter the social choice,
Considering two voting methods below, the first method
satisfies condition III while the second one violates condition
III.
Let there be five voters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and four
candidates (x, y, z, w); also, let the voters rank the candidates
in the following ways:
Method I: The Condorcet Criterion
VOTERS RANK ORDER OF ALTERNATIVES
The voting is based on majority rules in a series of
contests between each pair of alternatives. A candidates is said
to be a winner unless he defeats all other candidates in the
pairwise contest. In this case, we can see from the above table,
x is the Condorcet winner.
COMPARING x WITH: x IS PREFERRED BY A MAJORITY COMPOSED OF:
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x is able to defeat all of y, z, w in pairwise contests. It
is the Condorcet winner. Deletion of any other alternatives will
not change the winner. Condorcet criterion satisfies condition
III is obvious since in a pairwise contest, only the two relevant
alternatives and their orders, not the irrelevant ones, are
taken into consideration.
Method II: The Borda Criterion
VOTERS CANDIDATES
x y z w
1 4 3 2 1
2 4 3 2 1
3 2 4 3 1
4 3 2 1 4
5 2 4 1 3
Totals 15 16 9 10
Among the four candidates, let the highest rank order have
four points, the next have three points, and so on. The voting is
based on the summation of points in the rank orders of
alternatives in the voters orderings; and the alternative with
the largest sum will be selected as the winner.
We can see that y obtains highest points and hence the
winner by the Borda criterion.
Suppose we now delete candidates, say, z and w, and retain x
and y in the contest. The candidate in the higher rank now gets
two points and the one in lower rank gets one points. The result
of the voting thus becomes:









We can notice that x now becomes the winner. The elimination
of z and w alters the winner. The Borda criterion violates
condition III.
Arrow insists that the acceptable majority rule should
satisfy at least the Condorcet criterion. Knowing the social
choices made in pairwise comparisons in turn determines the
entire social ordering and therefore with the social choice
function
Violation of condition III may permit the manipulation of
the outcomes by mere introduction or deletion of candidates
causing the Condorcet winner to be defeated.
Condition IV; Citizens' Sovereignty
The social welfare function is not to be imposed.|-20] A
social welfare function will be said to be imposed if, for some
pair of distinct alternatives x and y, xRy for any set of
individual orderings R,..., Rn, where R is the social
ordering corresponding to R-,..., Rn[2l]
If a social welfare function is imposed, say xRy, then the
society can never choose y over x whatever how many individuals
prefer y to x. It means some preferences are forbidden. (Notice
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that if xRy holds, then yPx does not hold.
If condition IV is violated, a social ordering can not be
preferred by the society even all individuals prefer it. We
certainly wish all choices to be possible if unanimously desired
by the group.[22] Hence the reason for holding the condition
is, to ensure the will of all individuals in a society is adopted
whenever it conflicts with a supposed general will or customary
choice.
Condition V: Nondictatorship
The social welfare function is not to be dictatorial.j-23] A
social welfare function is said to be dictatorial if there exists
an individual i such that, for all x and y, xPy implies xPy
regardless of the orderings,..., Rn of all individuals
other than i, where P is the social preference relation
corresponding to R-,..., R [24]
The reason for this condition is obvious. Since we are
aiming at construction of an aggregation device, we would like to
take all individuals's preferences into consideration. If one
individual's preferences can determine the social outcome
regardless of the preferences of all others, the choice is not a
social choice at all.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Arrow asserts that the five conditions mentioned above are
apparently reasonable conditions on the construction of a social
welfare function. He says, taken together they express the
doctrines of citizens' sovereignty and rationality in a very
general form.[25] Arrow also states that the five conditions
together with two ordering axioms cannot be satisfied
simultaneously by any summation method. There is an inconsistency
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among these conditions. And he asserts: If there are at least
three alternatives which the members of the society are free to
order in any way, then every social welfare function satisfying
conditions 2 and 3 and yielding a social ordering satisfying
Axioms I and II must be either imposed or dictatorial[26]
This proposition is known as the Arrow's impossibility theorem.
It means that every summation method satisfying conditions I, II,
III and axiom of connectivity and transitivity must violate
either condition IV (citizens' sovereignty) or condition V
(nondictatorship).
In Arrow's revised proof,(notes on the theory of social
choice, 1963), condition II and IV are replaced by the Pareto
principle.
Pareto Principle: If xPy for all i, then xPiy.'y] That is
to say, if every individual prefers x to y, then so does
society
Now we try to prove that the Pareto principle is logically
implied from condition II and IV jointly:
From condition IV, a social ordering, say yRx, is not
imposed with reference to a set of individual orderings R,
R2,... R Since not yRx is logically equivalent to xPy.
In other words, the social ordering xPy can be chosen by the
society.
Supposing in the set of individual orderings, R1 R2...
Rn and the social ordering xPy, there are some individuals do
not prefer x to y. Now changing all these individuals'
preferences by raising x in their preference order over y and
thus achieve unanimity. From condition II, the social ordering
should respond positively or at least not negatively to the
alterations of individual's preferences. The social ordering
therefore must continue to be xPy.
If the set of individuals' orderings, R, R2,... Rn
are unanimously prefer x over y; then, from condition I alone, we
obtain Pareto principle that the society should prefer x over y.
Pareto principle is actually a unanimity rule which forbid a
social ordering of a pair of alternatives contrary to every one's
preferences. The contrary social ordering could come from two
ways:
(1) a social outcome nobody wants could come out of the
method of summation, but this is forbidden by condition II;
(2) a social outcome is imposed from outside the system, but
this is prohibited by condition IV.
Since Pareto principle is equivalent to condition II and IV,
Arrow's theorem can be demonstrated by showing the inconsistency
among conditions I, III, V and Pareto principle.
CHAPTER TWO
PROOF OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
In this chapter, I will try to prove Arrow's theorem. The
proof will consist of two sections. In the first section, I will
consider a choice situation where involves three alternatives and
more than two individuals. While in section two, I will apply the
result obtained from the first section to prove the theorem still
holds when the number of alternatives is greater than three.
In the first section, again I will divide it into two parts.
In the first part, I will prove that if an individual is a
decisive set for any pair of alternative, then he is a decisive
set for all pairs of alternatives and thus is a dictator in
violation of condition V. In part two of section I, I will try to
prove, in fact, a single individual can be a decisive set for a
pair of alternative under condition I, III and Pareto principle.
Combining part one and two, we can see that condition I, III and
Pareto principle logically imply the negation of condition V.
Hence, I show that the five conditions are inconsistent.
§2.1 Section 1; Part One
Before we start the proof, we define the notion of a decisive
set in the following:
Decisive Set: A set of individuals, V, is said to be
decisive for x against y if the social outcome is xPy when
every individual in V prefers x to y for all sets of
individual orderings•[29]
A decisive set V, may contain majority, minority of
individuals or even one individual.
Arrow further makes a distinction between 'decisive' and
'almost decisive'.
(1) Decisiveness: xDy means that x is socially preferred to
y whenever (individual) I prefers x toy, regardless of the
orderings of other individuals;
(2) Almost Decisiveness: xDy means that x is socially
preferred to y if individual I prefers x to y and all other
individuals have the opposite preference.[30]
It should be noted that xDy implies xDy since 'decisiveness'
includes the situation of 'almost decisiveness'. Now, we try to
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If a single individual 1 is decisive for x
against y, where x is not equal to y, then he is decisive
for any pair drawn from the three alternatives (x, y, z).
We construct two sets: Vl, which consists of a single
individual 1; and V3, which consists the rest of all other
individuals 2, 3,..., m; where m is greater than or equal to
two. Also, let be the preference of individual 1, Pj be
the social ordering of V3 and P be the social ordering of the
whole society.
Step 1
Suppose the following situations:
(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for x against y. i.e.
xDy (Assumption)
Under condition I, the following individual orderings are
admissible:
(2) For V-: Individual 1 prefer x to y and order y over z
i.e. xP-y, yP-z and xP-z (By transitivity)
(3) For V: All other individual ranks y over z and
chooses y against x. i.e. yPjZ, yPjX.(It should be noted
that the preference relation between alternatives x and z
has not been specified.)
From the preference structures above, we select the social
outcome by means of pairwise comparisons in accordance with the
requirement of condition III.
i. Since individual 1 is almost decisive for x against y, thus
the social preference is xPy. (1.1)
ii. Since both Vx and V3 prefer y to z, by Pareto principle
the social preference is yPz (1.2)
iii. From (1.1), (1.2); We obtain xPy together with yPz.
According to the axiom of transitivity, we get the social
preference xPz (1.3)
However, only individual 1 prefers x to z, and the social
preference is obtained without any consideration about the
preferences regarding alternatives x and z of individuals in
V3. The social preference xPz follows from xPxz alone
regardless of the preferences of the rest of individuals in the
society. This means that the single individual 1, is also
decisive for x against z provided that he is given to be almost
decisive for x over y.
i.e. xDy implies xE .(1.4)
Step 2
Now, supposing that:
(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for x against z. i.e.
xDz (Assumption)
Under condition I, the following individual orderings are
admissible:
(2) For: Individual 1 prefer y to x and order x over z
i.e. yPx, xPz and yPz (By transitivity)
(3) For: All other individual ranks z to x and
chooses y against x. i.e. zPjX, yPjX.(It should be noted
that the preference relation between alternatives y and z
has not been specified.)
i. From xDz, we have xP2 .(2.1
ii. By Pareto principle, yP-x and yPjX together, we can
obtain yPx (2.2)
iii. From (2.1) and (2.2), by transitivity we get yPz—(2.3)
The social outcome yPz is arrived at only from a single
individual's preference, yPz.
Therefore, xDz implies yDz (2.4)
This means that if an individual 1 is almost decisive for x
against z, then he is also decisive for y against z.
Step 3
Again, considering the following situations:
(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for y against z. i.e.
yDz (Assumption)
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(2) For Vj: Individual 1 prefer y to z and order z over x
i.e. yPjz, zP-x and yP-x (By transitivity)
(3) For V3: All other individual ranks z to y and
chooses z against x. i.e. zP-y, zP-x.(It should be noted
J J
that the preference relation between alternatives x and y
has not been specified.)
We obtain the results,
i. yDz means yPz (3.1)
ii. From zP-x and zPjX, we obtain zPx (3.2)
iii. (3.1) and (3.2) jointly yields yPx (3.3)
Hence, yDz implies yDx (3.4)
Step 4
Let the following situations be given:
(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for y against x. i.e.
yDx (Assumption)
(2) For: Individual 1 prefer z to y and order y over x
i.e. zP-y, yPjX and zP-x (By transitivity)
(3) For V3: All other individual ranks x to y and
chooses z against y. i.e. xPjy, zPjy.(It should be noted
that the preference relation between alternatives x and z
has not been specified.)
i. By yDx, we get yPx
ii. From zPy and zP-y, we obtain zP]
iii. From (4.1) and (4.2), zPx is resulted







(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for z against x. i.e.
zDx (Assumption)
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(2) For V: Individual 1 prefer z to x and order x over y
i.e. zP-jX, xP-jy and zP-jy (By transitivity)
(3) For V3: All other individual ranks x to z and
chooses x against y. i.e. xPjZ, xPjy.(It should be noted
that the preference relation between alternatives y and z
has not been specified.)
By zDx, we have zP
From xP-y and xPjy, it means xF
. From (5.1) and (5.2), zPy is resulte







(1) Individual 1 is almost decisive for z against y. i.e.
zDy (Assumption)
(2) For V-: Individual 1 prefer x to z and order z over y
i.e. xPxz, zPy and xP1y (By transitivity)
(3) For V3: All other individual ranks y to z and
chooses x against z. i.e. yPjZ, xPjZ.(It should be noted
that the preference relation between alternatives x and y
has not been specified.)
zDy means zPy
From xP-z and xP-z, yields xP:




Thus, zDy implies xDy .(6.4)
Step 7















Recalling the fact that xDy implies xDy, for all variables x















From (1.4) and (7.1) we have:
xDy— xDz
From (8.1) and (2.4), we obtain:
xDy— yDz
From (8.2) and (7.2), we have,
xDy— yDz
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From (8.4) and (7.3), we deduce:
xDy— yDc
From (8.5) and (4.4), we obtain:
xDy— zD:
From (8.6) and (7.4), we have:
xDy— zD.
From (8.7) and (5.4), we get:
xDy— zD
From (8.8) and (7.4), we find
xDy— zD}








Putting all the results in a flow chart, we get:
xDy— xDz—xDz—yDz— yDz—» yDx— yDx —zDx —zDx- zDy-
zDy— zDx— zDx—»zDy—zDy— xDy— xDy.
We should notice that xDy implies xDy from the chart, and
recalling the fact that xDy implies xDy. This is to say, xDy is
logically equivalent to xDy. Whenever an individual 1 is almost
decisive for x against y, he is also decisive for x against y and
vice versa.
The above results also show that, given an individual is
almost decisive for x against y, he is decisive for the social
orderings: xPy, xPz, yPz, yPx, zPx and zPy. For a set of
alternatives containing only three elements: (x, y, z), there are
all together six ways of pairwise preference relation among the
alternatives. They are exactly the same social orderings which is
decisive by the individual 1. Hence, we can conclude that if an
individual is decisive for any pair of alternative, then he is
decisive in all pairs for a set of three alternatives. The proof
of part I is thus completed.
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Section Is Part Two
Now we proceed to prove the following proposition, in fact,
is true:
Proposition 2: Under condition I, III and Pareto principle,
there exists a single individual 1, is decisive for x against
y, where x is not equal to y, for a set of alternatives
containing only three elements: (x, y, z).
By the Pareto principle, there is at least one decisive set
for any pair of alternatives drawn from the triplet (x, y, z),
namely, the set composed of all individuals.
Among all sets of individuals which are decisive for some
pairs of alternatives, we define a set which is a minimally
decisive set in the sense that subtration of a single member
would make it indecisive for any pair.
First of all, we construct the following sets:
M: The set of all individuals.
V: A minimally decisive set.
V-: A set contains a single individual of V.
V2 A set contains the remaining individuals of V.
V: A set contains the individuals not in V.
The set of choosers is divided into two groups,the one in
minimally decisive set and that not in the minimally decisive
set. Moreover, the set of minimally decisive set is also divided
into two parts: a single individual and the rest. We use
mathematical symbols to represent the relations among the four
sets as:
Vi U V2= V (read, the union of V| and V2 equals V)
V U V3= M.
Section 1: Part Two -25- Chapter Two
There are at least two individuals in M, since V2 and
V3 cannot both be empty. Otherwise, it is obviously violation of
condition V (Nondictatorship).
Now we start the proof of the proposition 2.
By condition I, the following individual orderings are
admissible:
1. Every individual in prefers x against z and z
against y.
(i.e. V: ieV xPz and zPy.)
2. Every individual in V2 prefers y against x and x
against z.
(i.e. Vj: jeV2 yPjX and xPjZ.)
3. Every individual in V3 prefers z against y and y
against x.
(i.e. V.: keV3 zPkY an YPjx-)
Let P-j, P2, P3 be the social preferences of the three
sets, V-jy V2 and V3 respectively.
The orderings of alternatives for the three sets are given
below:
For V-L: xPz, zP-y, and xP-y (by transitivity)
For V2: yP2x, xP2z, and yP3z (by transitivity)
For V3: zP3y, yP3x, and zP3x (by transitivity)
This can be recognized as a socially paradoxical orderings
when each set containing only one member.
Step 1
As required by condition III, we make a pairwise comparisons
among the orderings. Since both V- and V2 prefer x to z and
Vx, V2 together form a minimally decisive set, we thus arrive
at the social outcome to be xPz.
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The society prefers x to z. i.e. xPz (1)
Step 2
Assuming that the social outcome is yPz.
Actually, only V2 prefers y to z. If the ordering of the
society hence becomes yPz, V2 must be a minimally decisive set.
However, this result contradicts to the given that V2 is not a
minimally decisive set. Therefore, our assumption that yPz is the
social outcome is false. This means that the social outcome is:
not yPz; which is zRy.
The social outcome is zRy (i.e. zPy or zly) (2)
(There are three possible relations among y and z. they are: yPz
[y is preferred to z], ylz [y is indifferent to z] and zPy [z is
preferred to y]. To say 'not yPz' is equivalent to affirm the
later two possibilities. The notion 'zPy' means 'either zly or
zPy')
From (1) and (2) and by transitivity, we obtain the social
outcome to be xPy. However, only a single individual prefers x
against y and the social outcome is xPy. This means that the
single individual is decisive for x against y. Hence we have
shown the proposition 2 is true. The proof of section 1 of
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is completed.
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Section 2
We now proceed to consider a set of alternatives containing
more than or equal to three elements. The size of the set is
unspecified.
We establish the following proposition, and try to prove it
by the method of mathematical induction:
P(n): Under condition I, III and Pareto principle, a single
individual is decisive for all pairs drawn from the set of




We have the proposition:
P(3): Under condition I, III and Pareto principle, a single
individual is decisive for all pairs drawn from the set of
alternatives containing three elements.
This proposition is what we have already proved in Section
1. Hence, P(n) is true for n=3.
Step 2
When n=4
We have the proposition:
P(4): Under condition I, III and Pareto principle, a single
individual is decisive for all pairs drawn from the set of
alternatives containing four elements.
Consider the set of alternatives to be: (x, y, z, a)
There are 4C3 possible ways to form triplets from the four
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alternatives. They are:
(x, y, z) (x, y, a4),
(x, z, a4), (y, z, a4).
(4C reads as 'three combination of four', which is equal to
four)
We should notice that each triplet contains at least two
elements from the set of alternatives (x, y, z).
From P(3), we know that a single individual at least
decisive in one pair of alternatives in every triplet. Also, from
the proof in section I, part one, we know that once a single
individual is decisive in one pair of alternative, he is decisive
for all pairs. We conclude that the single individual is decisive
for all pairs drawn from the set of four alternatives. Therefore,
P(n) is true when n=4.
Step 3
Now we suppose that P(n) is true for k, where k is a
positive integer greater than three. We have the proposition:
P(k): Under condition I, III and Pareto principle, a single
individual is decisive for all pairs drawn from the set of
alternatives containing k elements.
We try to show that P(k+1) is also true.
Consider the set of alternatives containing k+1 elements to
be: (x, y, z, a4, a5,... ak, ak+1). There are all
together ways of forming triplets from k+1 alternatives
of the set. And each triplet contains at least two elements from
the set containing k elements: (x, y, z, a4, a,... ak)
From our assumption, P(k) is true. Therefore, a single individual
is decisive at least in one pair of alternatives in each triplet
formed from the set of k+1 alternatives. Again, from the prove in
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part one of Section I: if a single individual is decisive in one
pair, he is decisive in all pairs in a triplet. We conclude that
a single individual is decisive in all pairs from the set of
alternatives containing k+1 elements, i.e. P(k+1) is true.
From the principle of mathematical induction, P(n) is true for
all positive integers n, where n is greater or egual to three. We
thus prove the proposition P(n).
The prove of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is completed.
SECTION II
THE ASSESSMENT OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
THE PROBABILITY OF ARROW'S PARADOX AND
UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
AND CARDINAL UTILITY SCALE
PARETO PRINCIPLE
NONDICTATORSHIP
THE NOTION OF RATIONALITY
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROBABILITY OF ARROW'S PARADOX AND
UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN
Arrow's impressive proof assures us that no social choice
mechanism can satisfy all together the five 'reasonable'
conditions and the two Axioms. In view of Arrow's impossibility
theorem, one may ask: How likely does the paradox may occur?
Before I tackle this question, it is advisable to clarify the
notion of probability first.
There are two approaches to the concept of probability. One
is the logical interpretation of probability, the other is the
relative-frequency interpretation. Under the logical
interpretation, probability is defined in numerical term as a
ratio of the number of times a favorable event could occur to the
total number of related events. For example, a perfectly fair
die, at any given roll, the occurrence of each faces are equally
likely, therefore, the probability of throwing a 6 when a die is
cast is 16. The logical notion of probability is exactly a
statement about the number of times a particular event could
occur given a set of related events. This notion bases on the
concept of equiprobability. In the above case, how can we
assign to each face of the die an equal possibility to occur?
Traditional philosophers and mathematicians normally use the
Principle of Indifference as an explanation. This principle says:
when we have no reason in believing that any event has higher
chance of occurrence than the others, under this situation, we
say the related events has equal probability. However, the
weakness of the logical interpretation is that it has nothing to
say about the reality. In our case, if the die is not fair, that
is to say, one face of the die has higher chance of occurrence
than the others, the foundation of the logical notion of
probability will be collapsed.
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The relative-frequency interpretation suggests that
probability is defined as the limit of the relative-frequency of
a particular event in an infinite sequence of related events.
Therefore, a probability statement is a statement about a future
event based on past events. For our convenience, we again use the
example of casting a die for discussion. When we say the
probability of throwing a 6 is 16, it is equivalent to say that
in an infinite sequence of events of throwing a die, the relative
frequency of throwing a 6 is converging to 1/6.[1]
The study of the probability of the voter's paradox is based
on the logical notion of probability. It is because empirical
studies is unreliable and difficult. There are several reasons
for this. In the first place, in actual voting situations, voters
are normally asked to indicate their first choice only. Without
the individual preference orders, it is impossible to determine
whether a paradox exists. Moreover, the manipulation of voting
procedures may eliminate the occurrence of a paradox. Finally, a
paradox is prohibited by some restrictions imposed on
individuals' preference among alternatives.
For the above practical difficulties and distortion, the
empirical study of the occurrence of the paradox is unlikely to
produce accurate results.[2] Therefore, the approach to the
assessment of the significance of Arrow's impossibility theorem
is mainly to estimate the logical probability of the voter's
paradox. This means that the total number of possible outcomes in
a voting situation are compared to the number of possible paradox
outcomes. It is assumed that the occurrence of every possible
outcomes are equally likely. We first see the case where only
three alternatives involved.
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Probabilities of Arrow's Paradox
in Three Alternatives
Now supposing there are three alternatives and three
individuals. Each individuals is free to order the three
alternatives.
In general, the number of logically possible orderings of a
given number of alternatives can be summarized in simple
mathematical terms. The number of logically possible preference
orderings is denoted by n!, where n!=n(n-l)(n-2)...(1), and n
is the number of alternatives. In our case, there are three
alternatives, therefore, there are 3! (i.e. 3x2x1=6) ways of
possible orderings. When there are n! orderings and m choosers,
there are (n!)m possible ways of arranging individual
preference orders. The formula for computing the number of
possible preference profiles thus is (n!)m, which means, n! to
the m power. In our case, with three individuals and three
alternatives, (i.e. n=3 and m=3.), there are (3!) =6 =216
possible preference profiles.
The problem remains is to determine how many of these 216
preference profiles produce a paradox. It has been calculated,
out of 216 preference profiles, six involve unanimity, 90 involve
a majority selecting the same order of alternatives. On the
remaining 120 cases, where all three choosers select different
preference profiles, there are 12 cases that involve selection of
two basic preference profiles which produce the paradox:
Classification I Classification II
Individual:
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By permutation of three choosers and the two basic
preference paradox producing profiles, there are 12 cases involve
paradox. They are:
Voters: Orderings
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
1 xyz yzx zxy zxy zyx xyz xzy xzy yxz yxz zyx zyx
2 yzx xyz yzx xyz yzx zxy yxz zyx xzy zyx xzy yxz
3 zxy zxy xyz yzx xyz yzx zyx yxz zyx xzy yxz xzy
Therefore, there are only 12 paradoxes out of 216 equally
possible preference profiles. The logical notion of probability
for a paradox is 12216= 0.0556. The paradox will occur less
than 5.6%. This is a rather low percentage.
However, in most voting situations, the number of choosers,
are enormous. The problem now we are concerning is: How does the
percentage for a paradox change as the number of individuals
increases? Since the number of possible preference increases
exponentially at a rapid rate, (recalling the fact that number of
possible preferences =(n!)m) for instance, with three
individuals and four alternatives, (i.e. n=4 and m=3.) the
possible preferences become (4!) =(24) =13824, in practice,
only a random sample of preference profiles is selected as
representative of the whole. The proportion of paradox-producing
preference profiles in the sample, is generalized an serviced as
an estimation of the proportion in the whole.
Niemi and Waisberg (1968) have obtained a pattern of
probability of paradox-producing profiles for three
alternatives.[- 3 j
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Probability of No Majority Winner for Three Alternatives
Number of choosers Probability Number of choosers Probability
1 0.0000 17 0.0827
3 0.0556 19 0.0832
5 0.0694 21 0.0836
7 0.0750 23 0.0840
9 0.0780 25 0.0843
11 0.0798
13 0.0811 infinite 0.0877
15 0.0820
From the above figures, it is interesting to note that the
paradox probability is not affected so much by the number of
individuals. When the number of choosers is greater than nine,
the probability of the paradox is almost the same as when the
number of choosers approaches infinity. In fact, as the number of
alternatives remains at three, and as the number of choosers
increases, the paradox probability rises from 0.056 to a limit of
about 0.088. That is to say, no matter of how many choosers are
under consideration, the paradox probability never rises to 10
percent for infinite number of choosers when there are only three
alternatives. This is relatively-small and might not cause much
trouble in our daily life. However, one may argue that not all
preference profiles are equally likely to happen.
In a real world situation, individual preferences are
determined by certain specific social, economic, political and
cultural norms. These norms create certain degree of homogeneity
in the society. Therefore, the results from Niemi and Weisberg
may be unrealistic.
A. k. Sen (1970) is also aware that the assumption of
equiprobability is unrealistic, he said, Niemi and Weisberg
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(1968) have obtained general expressions for the probability of
there being no majority winner. The results are, however,
difficult to apply to all individuals without difference, but
depending on the nature of the social alternatives and variations
of such things as tastes, class background, etc., of different
individuals, the individuals' probability distributions may
really differ substantially.[5]
It would be more realistic to assume that some alternatives
have better chance of being preferred than the others.
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Partial Cultures3.2
Now supposing that not all preference orders has equal
chance of being preferred. That is to say, some alternatives were
apriori more likely to be chosen as preference than others. Then,
what would be the paradox probability?
A situation in which some alternatives are apriori more
likely to occur than others has been called as partial culture.
Before expressing this concept in symbol, I first introduce the
notion of probability vector. This notion is a listing of the
probabilities for each individual preference orderings. In the
case of three alternatives, there are six possible preference
profiles. If all these preference profiles are equiprobable, then
each has a probability of 16 to be chosen as first preference.
The probability vector thus is: (16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16);
where each of the factions stands for one preference order.
The probability vector can be used to express any situation
of partial culture. For example, in a situation where the
preference orders xzy and zxy are prohibited, the probability
vector for that partial culture will be:
(xyz, xzy, yzx, yxz, zxy, zyx)=
(14, 0, 14, 14, 0, 14)
The above probability vector has been recognized as the
single-peakedness preference profiles, which we shall discuss
later.
Since the probability of the voter's paradox in partial
cultures depends not only on the number of individuals and
alternatives, but also on the structure of the probability
vector. Therefore, there is no generalized results of the
paradox probability. However, in the perspective of uneven
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distribution of probabilities among alternatives, some partial
cultures may result a higher paradox probability than that of the
impartial one with the same number of individuals and
alternatives. To illustrate this point, let us consider the case
of three individuals and three alternatives in the following
partial cultures:
Case 1:
The probability vector: (xyz, xzy, yzx, yxz, zxy, zyx)=
( 0, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15)
In this partial culture, one preference order, xyz is
prohibited, the remaining five preference orders are assumed to
be equiprobable for the convenience of our discussion. With five
preference orders and three choosers, there are 5-125 possible
preference profiles. Recalling the fact that there are only two
basic paradox-producing profiles: Classification I(xyz, yzx,
zxy), and Classification II(xzy, yxz, zyx). Elimination of the
preference order xyz, means that the six paradoxes associated
with Classification I becomes impossible. The remaining six
paradoxes resulted are from Classification II only. Therefore,
the paradox probability for this partial culture is 5125= 0.048
Case 2;
The probability vector: (xyz, xzy, yzx, yxz, zxy, zyx)=
( 0, 14, 0, 14, 14, 14)
Under this partial culture, there are 4= 64 possible
preference orders and again 6 paradoxes are resulted. This is
because the two preference orders eliminated are from the same
basic paradox-producing profiles. We thus obtain the paradox
probability= 664= 0.09
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Case 3:
The probability vector: (xyz, xzy, yzx, yxz, zxy, zyx)=
( 0, 0, 14, 14, 14, 14)
In this partial culture, the elimination of xyz and xzy are
from Classification I and Classification II respectively. In
other words, all paradox preference orders generated from either
of the paradox-producing preference profiles are eliminated. In
this case, the paradox probability becomes zero. (It can be seen
that by a suitable restriction on the admission of preference
orders, paradoxes are eliminated)
Case 4:
The probability vector: (xyz, xzy, yzx, yxz, zxy, zyx)=
( 0, 13, 0, 13, 0 13)
In this partial culture, there are all together 3= 27
possible preference orders. Since the preference orders xyz,
yzx, zxy belong to the same basic paradox-producing profile.
Three paradoxes from Classification II still persist. Hence, the
paradox probability= 627= 0.22
From the above cases, we can notice that once a preference
order of a paradox-producing preference profile is eliminated,
all of the six paradoxes associated with that preference profile
are vanished. The further elimination of any other preference
order from that profile does not reduce the number of paradox.
Moreover, we can see that the paradox probability increases as
more preference orders are eliminated. The paradox probability
increases from 5125 (=0.048) to 664(=0.09), and to 627(=0.22).
The probability of the paradox can be as high as 22 percent.
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Comparing it with the result 0.056 obtained under the
equiprobability assumption, it is concluded that in certain
partial culture, the paradox probability could be nearly four
times of that in an impartial culture. Under a partial culture,
the Arrow's paradox could be significant even when there are only
three alternatives and three choosers.
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3.3
Probability of Arrow's Paradox for Mare Than Three Alternatives
From the above discussion, we only focus on the paradox
probability for three alternatives. However, what would be the
paradox probability when alternatives are more than three? Niemi
and Weisberg (1968) has worked out the probabilities of no
majority for different number of'alternatives when the number of
voters approaches to infinity.
Limiting Values of Probabilities of No Majority Winner [6]
Number of Probability Number of Probability
alternatives alternatives
1 0.0000 20 0.6811
2 0.0000 25 0.7297
3 0.0877 30 0.7648
4 0.1755 35 0.7914
5 0.2513 40 0.8123
10 0.4887 45 0.8292
15 0.6087
We can notice that, as the number of alternatives increases,
the paradox probability approaches one or certainty. If we put
the paradox probability as a function of the number of




In reality, it is impossible to have infinite number of
alternatives. However, under practical consideration, given that
the number of alternatives admissible is not more than ten, the
paradox probability would be as high as 50%, which can hardly be
regarded as insignificant. If in a partial culture, as we have
discussed earlier, the occurrence of the paradox might be more
severe. In view of this depressing fact, it is advisable to think
some ways out of Arrow's paradox.
Unrestricted Domain
From the previous discussion we notice that the significance
of the probability is mainly due to the increase of the number
of alternatives and a certain partial culture. However, we also
notice that in a particular partial culture, paradoxes are
eliminated completely. This result may give us some idea that
certain restriction on the admission of preference orders can
reduce the paradox probability to zero. To avoid Arrow's paradox,
we should determine what conditions are sufficient for a
transitive social outcome. The most well-known and useful
condition of sufficiency is proposed by Duncan Black. (1958)
This method is known as the single-peakedness method.
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3.4
Sinqle-Peakness Method
This condition is first suggested by Duncan Black. The term
•single-peakedness1 is derived from its geometric interpretation.
A preference order might be presented in two-coordinate system
with the alternatives arranged on a horizontal axis and the rank
in the individual chooser's preference order on the vertical
axis. For example, the three possible preference orders zyx,
xyz, and yzx can be represented as below:
The above curves are all single-peaked. A curve is said to
be single-peakedness if
(1): it always slopes up or always down; or
(2): it slopes up a point and then down.
The condition of single-peakedness says that if a set of
preference orders can be represented geometrically as a set of
single-peaked curves, then there exists some alternatives are
preferred by a majority and the social outcomes are transitive.
Let us consider the case of three choosers for three
alternatives to illustrate Black's method. Suppose the preference
orders for the three individuals A, B, C are xyz, yxz, and zxy
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The possible arrangements of all preference orders as a set
of single-peaked curves is the sufficient condition for a
transitive social outcome because it eliminates some possible
preference orders to be the choice of the choosers.
In the above example, under the requirement of
single-peakedness, individual B is not allowed to choose the
preference order yzx. If individula B were allowed to choose it.
a paraox will be obtained. That is, A:xyz, B: xyz, C: zxy.This





They are all nonsingle-peaked set of orderings. We can see
that a paradox-producing preference profiles cannot be
represented as a set of single-peaked curves under any possible
graphical representation. Therefore, single-peakedness method is
a limitation on the admission of preference orders, it eliminates
all paradox-producing preference profiles. Single-peakedness
method states that some alternatives cannot be the last choice of
any individual. To see why the restriction of single-peakedness
rules put the possibility of the voter's paradox, we first
outline the two basic paradox producing profiles: Classification
I(xyz, yzx, zxy), and Classification Il(xzy, yxz, zyx). Note that
each alternatives is in a different rank for each individuals in
the two paradox-producing preference profiles. Also notice that
each alternatives is ranked as the last choice once at each
paradox-producing preference profiles. Elimination of any
alternative as the last choice, means the elimination of certain
preference orders from both of the paradox-producing preference
profiles. Therefore, paradoxes are eliminated.
In our example, if either x or z were eliminated as a
possible last choice, one preference order from each of the
paradox-producing preference profiles would be eliminated. This
makes occurrence of paradox impossible.
Value Restrictedness
If one examines the two basic paradox-producing preference
profiles displayed previously, one will notice that each
alternative appears in every rank order in both the profiles. In
view of this structure, Sen (1966) states a fully general
sufficient condition for transitivity of social orderings. Sen
defines the notion of value-restrictedness as an extension of
single-peakedness. A set of individual preference orders is said
to be value-restricted if any alternative cannot be the first,
second, or third choice for any individual.
Sen proves that majority rule satisfies Condition II- V and
transitivity, provided that the set of alternatives is
value-restricted. [-7] His proof, however, shows that both
single-peakedness and value-restrictedness methods are violation
of Arrow's condition of unrestricted domain. The paradox thus can
be avoided. However, an important question remains unsolved, is
the justification for this violation. We cannot infringe the
condition simply to avoid paradox.
The Infinite Regress Argument
A justification for the infringement of Condition I has been
proposed by A. F. Mackay (1980). As he says, M[o]ur new approach
will involve showing how both Arrow's result and the paradoxes of
majority voting contain instances of an ancient familiar
philosophical strategy, viz. the infinite regress argument.
Following that we will show how accepting pattern restrictions
like single-peakedness can be comparable to positing a first
cause the traditional remedy for a regress.[8]
An infinite regress argument is to argue that by assuming
some characteristics (eg. transitivity, asymmetry) about a binary
relation, an infinite regress will be deduced. Since an infinite
regress is unacceptable, something to block the regress must be
imposed as to establish a starting point. The argument involves
two stages, first, it is to argue that an infinite regress is
deduced; second, the positing of a starting point is a necessary
remedy.
Mackay first employs Sanford's structure of an infinite
regress argument:
So long as R is interpreted in the same way throughout,
any five statements of the following forms are mutually
inconsistent:
(1) Existence. (3x)(3y)Rxy
Something exists which has relation R to something.
(2) Asymmetry. (x)(y)(Rxy Ryx)
If x has R to y, then y does not have R to x.
(3) Transitivity, (x)(y)(z)((Rxy&Ryz Rxz)
If x has R to y which in turn has R to z, then x has R
to z.
(4) Existential Heredity, (x)(y)(Rxy ( z)R)
If x has R t9 y, then something has R to x.
(5) Finitude. There are only finitely many things related
by relation R. [9]
The above five statements have been proved as mutually
inconsistent by David H. Sanford (1975).r1Qi
Mackay comments: As Sanford remarks, most traditional uses
of the argument assume the first three characteristics
(existence, asymmetry, and transitivity) and pit heredity, whose
denial implies a first cause, against finitude, whose denial
implies a vicious regress....And from existence, heredity,
transitivity, and finitude one can deduce nonasymmetry. And so
on....we will argue that the paradoxes of majority voting can be
viewed in this way. They are applications of infinite regress
arguments in which we establish four of these characteristics
about the binary relation social preference, and deduce from that
the denial of the fifth, [that is the finitude]|--qj
In fact, what Mackay trying to do is to apply Sanford's
structure of the infinite argument into Arrow's conditions and
Axioms. From those Arrow's conditions, a preference cycle is
resulted, which violates the Transitivity. If transitivity is
satisfied, there will be infinite regress of preference patterns.
Since infinite regress of preference patterns are undesirable,
the condition of heredity should be given up. This means, there
exists at least one x has R to y, and nothing has R to x. If
Ry is the relation that x is majority preferred to y, then
violation of the condition of heredity is equivalent to say:
there exists one x has majority preferred to y and x is not
ranked the last by majority. Thus, the infringement of Arrow's
Condition I is analogues to the imposition of a starting point to
block an infinite regress. Mackay argues that, [i]t is hard to
feel positing a first cause is an unnatural, or ad hoc way out of
an infinite regress.[12] Therefore, an infringement of
unlimited scope as the natural way out. And as before, accepting
such a pattern restriction is comparable to positing a first
cause, the standard remedy for a regress. j- 3 j
Value Restrictedness
If one examines the two basic paradox-producing preference
profiles displayed previously, one will notice that each
alternative appears in every rank order in both the profiles. In
view of this structure, Sen (1966) states a fully general
sufficient condition for transitivity of social orderings. Sen
defines the notion of value-restrictedness as an extension of
single-peakedness. A set of individual preference orders is said
to be value-restricted if any alternative cannot be the first,
second, or third choice for any individual.
Sen proves that majority rule satisfies Condition II- V and
transitivity, provided that the set of alternatives is
value-restricted. |--7 j His proof, however, shows that both
single-peakedness and value-restrictedness methods are violation
of Arrow's condition of unrestricted domain. The paradox thus can
be avoided. However, an important question remains unsolved, is
the justification for this violation. We cannot infringe the
condition simply to avoid paradox.
Admittedly, Mackay's attempt is fascinating. Nevertheless, I
do not think his way of handling Arrow's case is at all
promising. First, I would think that Mackay seems to disregard the
ethical implication of the infringement of Condition I. Arrow's
case is different from other types of infinte regress for its
presupposed conditions are value laden. The positing of 'first
cause' indeed is ethically problematic. It cannot be justified
merely to block an 'infinte regress'. The infringement of
Condition I will mean the infringement of certain values which
are upheld by Arrow, that is, the freedom of choice. I think, an
infringement of a value principle should only be supported by a
suitable moral argument. Moreover, even if we assume that the
positing of a 'first cause' is permissible, then, immediate
questions followed are: Which preference order should be
restricted? Who has the authority to decide which social
preference must be prohibited? Will this move invite a dictator
thus is the violation of Condition V? Finally, if we take the
individualistic position seriously, we shall think that the
demand for all logically possible preference orders to be
permissible is at all natural and desirable. Any infringement of
the Condition I is the infringement of values upheld by
liberalism. Therefore, the infringement of the unrestricted
domain is ethically unjustified. This is why I do not think the
alteration of Condition I is promising.
CHAPTER FOUR
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
AND CARDINAL UTILITY SCALE
This condition, as suggested by its name, requires that
[t]he choice made from any fixed environment S should be
independent of the very existence of alternative outside S .j-jj
As we have discussed previously, condition III imposes two
constraints on a social mechanism. First, a social choice
mechanism should only respond to a restricted class of
alternatives. Second, it should respond to preference orderings
of individuals only.
In Arrow's original version, he used an example to
illustrate the reasonableness of this condition. In particular,
suppose that there are three voters and four candidates, x, y, z,
and w. Let the weights for the first, second, third, and fourth
choices be A, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Suppose that individuals
1 and 2 rank the candidates in the order x, y, z and w, while
individual 3 ranks them in the order z, w, x, and y. Under the
given electoral system, x is chosen. Then, certainly, if y is
deleted from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to
the remaining candidates should yield the same result, especially
since, in this case, y is inferior to x according to the tastes
of every individual; but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated
electoral system would yield a tie between x and z.]
Put Arrow's example graphically, we have the following
two cases:
Case 1:




















Total: 10 7 8 5
Social preference:
Case 2:
















Total: 7 7 4
Social preference:
In case 2, after elimination of y, the social outcome
changes without any corresponding change in the preference
orderings of the individuals. Arrow supposes that y is the
•irrelevant alternative' outside the fixed environment S. It is
unreasonable to alter the outcome by merely introduction or
detection of an 'irrelevant alternative'.
Arrow, not only regards rank-order method unreasonable, he
also claims that interpersonal comparison is implausible,
therefore, cardinal scaling is meaningless.
In the discussion about the measurability and interpersonal
comparability of utility, Arrow said, [t]he viewpoint will be
taken here that, interpersonal comparison of utilities has no
meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to
welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility.
He also added, [i]f we cannot have measurable utility, in this
sense, we cannot have interpersonal comparability of utilities a
fortiori• [3]
Therefore, cardinal utility scaling is permissible only when
the above challenges can be overcome.
Up to this point, we can see two aspects of argument
associated with condition III. One is concerning about the
reasonability of alteration of social outcome by the elimination
of an alternative from a given environment S. Another aspect is
about the plausibility of a cardinal utility scaling. In the
following discussion, I shall deal with these two aspects
separately. For my convenience, I shall call these two aspects as
the independent aspect and the cardinal utility aspect.
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The Independent Aspect
As we have discussed before, condition III requires that in
comparing any pair of alternatives, the social choice mechanism
should not respond to information concerning other alternatives
not in the choice set. The immediate question is: Which is the
'relevant choice set'? In Arrow's original version, [i]f S is
the set [x, y] consisting of the two alternatives x and y,
condition 3 tells us that the choice between x and y is
determined solely by the preferences of the members of the
community as between x and Y-[4] Arrow also claims that,
[k]nowing the social choice made in pair-wise comparison in turn
determines the entire social ordering and there with the social
choice function C(S) for all possible environments] Thus, a
relevant choice set is confined to just two alternatives in each
instances. But why should we restrict our choice and comparison
only between two alternatives and not involve more than two?
Arrow, seems to take it for granted and has no reply. However, on
the contrary Fishburn (1973) suggests that a decision mechanism
should compare all of the alternatives simultaneously, rather
than two at a time. In this way, some intransitive social
outcomes from an ordinal preference profile can thus be
dissolved. Suppose we use 'cardinal utility' in a preference
profile which yields paradox: r-i
















Total: 17 24 22
Social preference:
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Notice that if we consider the preference order only, a
paradox is resulted. However, if we consider cardinal utilities,
alternative y will be the social outcome, z the second, and x the
last. Cardinal scaling takes all the preferences into
consideration and has the advantage to dissolve paradox.
Plott (1967) has pointed out, Arrow's example is erroneous.
Plott shows that the two sets of alternatives are not the same in
each case as demanded by the formal definition of the condition.
In the first case, the given environment S, is (x, y, z, w),
where y is included; while in the second case, the environment S
is (x, z, w), where y is excluded. Strictly speaking, the
condition is not violated in Arrow's example. The change of the
choice set is not due to the presence or absence of 'irrelevant
alternative' outside the given environment, it is because the
change in ranks points assigned to each alternatives. The
alteration of the social outcome is a response to a different set
of weights to each alternative.
Ray (1973), in his article Independence of irrelevant
Alternatives adds that Arrow himself seems to confuse his
condition with that of the Radner-Marschak condition of
independence of irrelevant alternatives. He illustrates his
condition 3 (IIA(A)) by giving an example which violates
IIA(R-M)[7]; Here IIA(R-M) is Radner-Marschak's condition of
independence of irrelevant alternatives which is defined as: if
x is an element of choice set of S and belongs to S, i.e.,
x e C (S) and xeS- C S together imply x€ C (S-).|- g j For f urther
disscusion, we first define the following notations: X is the
universal set of alternatives assumed to be finite; S is a subset
of X; R is a social ordering on X held by individual i;
Rs is the relation R over a subset S of X; u is
a preference profile for a set of individuals, u=[R,...,
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Rj}]; C(u,S) is the choice set of S with respect to u; is a
ranking function that associates an integer with each
alternative for a preference ordering R; r(x) is the number
of alternatives strictly preferred by x. Given a profile uR
there is a ranking function r given by r(x)=£r i(x);
rs is a ranking function that associates an integer with
each alternative in a subset S of X for a preference ordering
Rz a social choice rule: the Global Borda Rule, is defined as:
C(u, S)=[x: r(x) 7 r(y) for all x, y€ S]; rs(x) is the
number of alternatives also in a subset of X that are strictly
preferred by x. Given a profile u=[Rp..., Rn] there is a
ranking function r given by rs(x)= rs(x); a social
choice rule: the Local Borda Rule, is defined as: C(u, S)=[ x:
rs(x) rs(y) for all x, y€S].
We now consider what Arrow's example is trying to illustrate
and see why rank-order method does not violate Arrow's condition
III by the following cases:
The Global Borda Rule:
Case 3:
For a universal set of alternatives X=[x, y, z, w].
Given a preference profile for a set of individuals: u=[R
R2, R3], where Rx: xPyPzPw; R2: xPyPzPw; R3: zPwPxPy.
(notice that it is exactly the preference profile used in Arrow's
example)
We calculate the ranking functions:
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For this profile u we would have, C(u, [xyzw])=[x], C(u, [xzw])=
[x].
Case 4;
• We will use the same global Borda rule to find a choice set for
another preference profile u'
For a universal set of alternatives X=[x, y, z, w].
Given a preference profile for a set of individuals: u'R',
R2'' R3'' were Ri': xPzPyPw; R2 1: yPxPzPw; R3':
zPyPwPx.
We calculate the ranking functions:
For this profile u1 we would have, C(u', [xyzw])= [y, z],
C(u', [xzw])=[z].
Here we should notice that we are getting different choices
from the same environment S: S=[x, z, w] at u and u' although the
two profiles are the same on the given environment S.(It can be
seen clearly by erasing all alternatives not in the environment
[here only alternative y], i.e. S»)
Since xRiy= xRi'y for the 9iven environment
[x, z, w] but C(S) is not the same as C'(S). It shows that the
global Borda rule violates the condition III.
Now, let us consider the local Borda rule:
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The Local Borda Rule
Case 5:
For a universal set of alternatives X=[x, y, z, w].
Given a preference profile for a set of individuals: u=[Rp
r2' R3-l' were Ri: xPyPzPw; R2: xPyPzPw; R: zPwPxPy.
(notice that it is exactly the preference profile used in Arrow's
example)
i) For the given environmentS=[x, y, z, w]
We calculate the ranking functions:
For the given environment S=[x,z,w]
We calculate the ranking functions:
Case 6:
We will use the same local Borda rule to find a choice set for
another preference profile u'
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For a universal set of alternatives X=[x, y, z, w].
Given a preference profile for a set of individuals:
where
For the given environmentS=[x, y, z, w]
We calculate the ranking functions:
For this profile u' we would have, C(u', [xyzw])=[y, z].
ii) For the given environment S=[x,z,w]
We calculate the ranking functions:
For this profile u' we would have
Here for a given environment
[x, z, w] and C(S) is the same as C'(S). It shows that the local
Borda rule satisfies the condition III.
Thus, we can see that the erroneous of Arrow's example is
that he first uses the global Borda rule to derive a rank-order of
alternatives from u over all X and obtains a choice set for the
environment [x, z, w]. After that, he uses the local Borda rule
The Independent Aspect -59- Chapter Four
to derive a choice set for the environment [x, z, w]. Arrow is,
in fact, demanding the choice obtained from the global Borda rule
as the same from that of the local Borda rule for the same
environment, but it is true only when the environment is the same
as the universal set of alternatives, i.e. S= X.
In fact, the independent of irrelevant alternatives
condition in Arrow's mind is that: If a voting rule chooses x as
a winner, and some alternative y is then removed from the set of
alternatives, the voting rule should still choose x as a winner.
condition, however, is guite different from the one given by
Arrow in the definition.
From the above analysis, the alteration of social outcome is
acceptable, it does not violate condition III. However, it does
not mean that the cardinal utility scaling is then well
justified, we have to go further into a more fundamental problem:
The plausibility of interpersonal comparison of cardinal
utilities.
for and but S.this
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The Cardinal Utility Aspect
Arrow charges cardinal scaling as meaningless since there is
no objective standard for interpersonal welfare comparison. I
think, this is the fundamental problem cardinalist has to face.
Cardinal utilities can be thought as units on an interval
scale. For example, suppose there are three alternatives with the
following utilities for an individual: x=10, y=5, z=3. That
individual prefers x to y by 5 utiles, and y to z by 2 utiles.
However, if we now add 10 utiles to the original units of the
three alternatives respectively, we can obtain the same interval
of utiles between alternatives but with different ratio. This
shows that the scaling is arbitrary. Thus, we can say that an
individual prefers one alternative to another by 5 utiles, but
cannot speak meaningfully that one alternative brings twice the
utility of another. This is the root of the problem of
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
John von Neumann and Oskar Mbrgenstern (1953), are the first
who suggested a cardinal-utility indicator for interpersonal
comparison. They employ the notion of 'lottery' in constructing
the indicator. In a lottery, we are risking some money gambling
for a prize. Normally, we either receive nothing or an amount
substantially great. In other words, we pay a little some of
money gambling for a relatively large prize with a relatively low
chance of winning. The combination of low risk and potential high
return counterbalances the relatively low probability of winning.
Now, let us see how this notion works.
Suppose that an individual has a lung canncer. He has to
choose between a full recovery or one year life-span. His doctor
tells him, if he does not have surgery, he will have only one
year to live. The surgery, however, is risky, at best he could
4.2
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have a full recovery but at worst, he may die. Now suppose that
the doctor says to that man, that initially the chances of full
recovery are 0.8, however, a complication is discovered and the
chance of full recovery reduces to 0.6. If at that point the
individual changes his mind and decides against surgery. The
probability at which that the individual would no longer choose
that alternative which is more preferred can be taken as a
measure of the intensity of preference. The justification for
this method is that an individual has a very strong preference
for one alternative over another, he would be willing to take a
chance on achieving it even when the chance of success is
small. The intensity of the preference is inversely proportional
to the chance of achieving it. This is a ratio scale. Moreover,
the indicator is confined to the range between zero and one. The
valu£ is not arbitrary and can have a meaningful interpretation.
This breakthrough enables interpersonal comparison plausible.
However, its application is quite limited, it only can be applied
to situations of uncertainty. When the outcomes or the
implementation of the choice is certain, the intensity of
preference cannot be measured through this method.
Another supplementary method for interpersonal comparison is
to assume that there is some commodities, usually money, which
has the same value to all individuals, and then we use this
commodity to measure other utilities. Obviously, the assumption
that money has the same value to all individuals is certainly
incorrect. However, if a group of individuals are economically
and psychologically homogenous, the use of money as an objective
standard for interpersonal comparison may not be unacceptable.
L. Dubins (1977) proposes to use money to bid for
alternatives, the amount the individual willing to pay for
achieving that alternative will be regarded as an indicator for
the intensity of his preference. In this voting method, each
voter are asked to bid for each alternative, and the alternative
with the highest total bid are chosen to be the winner. Voters
are allowed to bid for a positive or negative amount, but his
bid has to add up and sum to zero. Collecting the bids made for
the winning alternative is followed. We collect the same amount
of money a voter bids. 'Collecting' a negative bid means paying
the voter that amount. Since the winning alternative will have a
positive total bid, we shall always collect more than we pay out.


























Total: -20 -15 +35
Social preference:
From the above preference profiles, individual 1 is
equivalent to say that he is indifferent among the three choices:
having alternative x win and pay $20, having y win and pay $10,
and having z win and being paid $30. In this example, z is the
winning alternative. $50 would be collected from individual 2,
$5 from individual 3, $25 from individual 5. $30 of the collected
money would give to individual 1 for compensation, and $15 to
compensate individual 4. We can see that individuals prefer
alternative z have to pay for it, and individuals dislike it are
compensated. The remaining $35 represents the cost of decision
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making. However, this method will induce insincere voting.
Suppose the preference profiles in the above example represent
sincere bids, and consider how individuals might be tempted to
bid insincerely. Individuals 2 and 5 get their first choice by
paying $50 and $25 respectively. This is considerably a large
amount. If they are sure that z will win by a good margin, they
can save money by bidding less. Thus, individual 2 could save




Similarly, individual 5 could also save $10 while still
obtaining what he wants by bidding x: -25, y: 10, z: 15:
INDIVIDUALS ALTERNATIVES
(insincere
Total: -7 -22 +25
Now consider what would be the outcome if both individual 2
and 5 bid insincerely





In this situation, both individuals have lost; and the money
got from compensation is less than it was worth to them to have x
instead of z. Moreover, an optimal choice cannot be made because
of insincere bidding.
In fact, if we collect the bids made for the winning
alternative, everyone will be tempted to underbid for the
alternative he believes will win. If there are some individuals
underbid the 'winning alternative', this alternative may loss,
and an inferior alternative may be selected. Every individuals
may be tempted to free ride and let the others pay for the
'winning alternative' which he prefers. This may end up with
undesirable outcome.
Up to this point, we can see that even the interpersonal
comparison problem can be solved in certain environments,
cardinalists, however, still have a tough work at hands. Cardinal
utility scaling is vulnerable to strategic manipulation easily.
This is what Arrow intends to prevent by imposing condition III
to a social choice mechanism. It is not until recently that a
scheme for sincere revelation of preferences was developed. This
A Preference Revealing Process -65- Chapter Four
scheme was first discovered by Edward H. Clarke (1971),and more
completely developed by Groves and Ledyard (1977). The
application of this idea to voting by bid was first made by
Tideman and Tullock (1976). This is called the Preference
Revealing Process.
4.2.1 A Preference Revealing Process
The essence of this process is that each individual is
offered a chance to change the social outcome that would occur
without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost
to others that results from including his vote in the decision.
A special charge: Clarke tax, is collected. The charge on any one
person will not be paid to any other person, a sum of money will
be resulted. This represents the cost of the decision making.
As in the example before, each individual will be asked to
submit bids for the alternatives, and again, individuals are
asked to bid for all alternatives sum to zero. In this time, we
shall not collect from each individual the amount he bid for the
winning alternative, but instead that amount of his bid which
made a difference to the outcome. Consider the preference
profiles of the previous example again, where alternative z is
the winner:
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INDIVIDUALS ALTERNATIVES (bids in dollars) Clarke Tax
Total without Indicated Individuals
From the above preference profiles, we can see that if
without individual 2, the outcome would have been x: 0, y: 15,
z: -15. Alternative y would have beaten alternative z by $30. We
charge individual 2 a tax of $30. Similarly, for other
individual the procedure is the same. For individual 4, without
him the outcome would have been x: -10, y: -40, z: 50. The
alternative y still would have won. Individual 4 did not affect
the outcome at all. Thus, there is no charge to him.
The general procedure is this. For example, with individual
5 alternative z is chosen, but without individual 5 another
alternative, x, would have won, beating z by $10. Individual 5's
Clarke tax is $10.
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Under this scheme, individuals who prefer the winning
alternative still have to pay, but they now only pay the amount
by which they influenced the decision. The moral justification
for this charge might be that each individual is paying exactly
the amount by which his participation reduced the total utility
of others. Losers are not compensated. If it does, it may induce
individuals to place insincere negative bids on the winning
alternative. This can destroy the preference revealing incentive
of the scheme. The total $40 collected in Clarke taxes represents
the cost of decision making.
The virtue of this system is that it motivates sincere
revelation of preferences. For instance, consider individual 5
whether it will be benefit for him to overstate the true amount
by which he favors, say, alternative z over x (the true amount is
$65). This would only be useful if z would not beat x when
individual 5 state his true difference of $65, but would beat x
only if he exaggerated his difference. But if this were the case,
the amount he pays may exceed $65, the amount at which he is
unwilling to pay for his preference. (It is because in this case
the rest of individuals prefer x to z, only individual 5 prefers
z to x and his vote changes the social outcome. Individual 5 is
the only one has to pay the compensation for other's loss.)
Certainly he will pay more than the original amount, $10, for his
favor. Therefore, if individual 5 obtained his preference by
overbidding, his Clarke tax would be more than obtaining that
preference is worth to him.
Would individual 5 wish to understate his preference for z
over x? The only motivation for doing this will be to try to save
money. But if z continues to win, individual 5's Clarke tax
remains unchanged. The tax he pays is determined independently of
the amount he bids since the charge depends only on the total
amounts that the other individuals bid. Hence, he could only save
money if his underbidding caused alternative z defeated. However,
his saving would be less than the amount he values alternative z
over other alternatives. Similarly, all individuals will be
motivated to state sincerely their preference difference between
any two alternatives. Thus, the problem of insincere preference
revelation is solved. No individual has to worry about.what
others will do, and a socially optimal decision using intensities
of preferences is arrived. However, we have to make several
assumptions before we can reasonably apply this method in real
situations. We have to assume that individuals do not wish to
hurt others, they vote out of self interests, and that
individuals do not form coalitions. Moreover, individuals under
considerations are economically and psychologically homogeneous,
so that the use of dollars to measure preference intensities is
reasonable.
In view of this scheme, we can more clearly see why rank
order method does not violate condition III. For instance, if we
delete alternative x from the choice setting, what difference
would it make? Consider individual 5 first, originally he reports
$10 for z over y. If x is dropped from consideration, individual
5 would no longer offer $65 for z against x. He would save
much money and become richer, and he might spend more of his
wealth to increase his demand for z instead of y, say, from $10
to $30 (e.g. y: -15, z: 15). Similarly, other individuals will
also reassign their bids to alternatives. Such wealth
redistribution effects could conceivably change the result,
x is not an 'irrevelent alternative', its presence or absence
affects the wealth of all individuals.
After going through the above lengthy discussion, I think we
can reasonably conclude that cardinal utility scaling does not
violate condition III as Arrow claims. It only violates Arrow's,
intuitive thinking that only ordinal information can be compared
meaningfully between individuals. From a theoretical perspective,
cardinal information is more precise and useful. In principle,
cardinal scale is better than ordinal scale. It should be more
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desirable if we can use cardinal scale instead of ordinal scale.
Cardinal utility scale has been regarded as 'meaningless' since
it is associated with several practical difficulties. One problem
has been the introduction of a meaningful indicator for measuring
the intensity of preference. Another fundamental problem is the
feasibility of interpersonal comparison of utility. Lastly, is
the problem of enforcing honesty. After all these obstacles have
been removed, we can see that the adoption of voting method using
intensities of preference in certain situations is acceptable and
well justified.
Although in some cases cyclical majority do not exist when
cardinal utilities are used, it can not solve the problem of
Arrow's paradox completely. Let us consider the following case:
INDIVIDUALS ALTERNATIVES
x _y z
1 20 10 5
2 5 20 10
3 10 5 20
Total: +35 +35 +35
Each of the alternatives from the above preference profiles
produces a total of 35 utiles. Here the cardinal utility scaling
does not dissolve the intransitve outcome. The use of cardinal
utility would avoid cyclical majorities in all other situations
in which the distribution of utility were not symmetrical. This
enables cardinal scaling severely weaken the occurrence of
paradox. However, Sen (1970) and Schwartz (1972), have obtained
impossibility results similar to Arrow's by using cardinal
utility scaling. Therefore, it may concluded that, even cardinal




It is a reiteration of the condition II and IV, namely, the
condition of positive association of individual and social values
and citizens sovereignty. Pareto Principle requires that if
every individual prefers x to y, then the society must prefer x
to y. Formally, the Pareto Principle is stated as: CONDITION P:
If xPiy for all i, then xPy-[i]
The justification for the Pareto Principle is implied from
the meaning of 'social choice. If a choice is unanimously
preferred by everyone in the society without exception, it is
absurd to deny that the choice of the whole society is not a
social choice at all! The problem of social choice is how to
design an aggregation device which can yield a commonly accepted
social choice when there is a disagreement or conflict. If there
is no disagreement or conflict, the problem of social choice
simply does not exist. Therefore, unanimity is the 'perfect' way
to solve the problem of social choice.
In view of this argument, a unanimity rule, which is a
collective decision rule derived from the Pareto relation, is
proposed by G. Tullock (1962). The individualistic theory of the
constitution we have been able to develop assigns a central role
to a single decision-making rule that of general consensus or
unanimity.[2] The unanimity rule can be expressed as: xPy
if and only if xPiy for all i, where i represents
an individual in the society.[3] Undoubtedly, unanimity is a
sufficient condition for a social choice. But whether it is a
necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice is
questionable. Although Arrow has not argued that unanimity should
be a desirable condition for a collective choice mechanism,
however, some scholars do think so. As it has been noticed by
Arrow, n[t]he assumption of...complete agreement among
individuals on the ordering of social alternatives, may seem
obviously contrary to fact. But, properly interpreted, it is at
the basis of a great portion of political philosophy, namely, the
idealist school. The fundamental doctrine of the group is that we
must distinguish between the individual will, as it exists at any
given instant under varying external influences, and the general
will, which is supposed to inhere in all and which is the same in
all; social morality is based on the latter. This view is
expressed in the works of Rousseau, Kant, and T. H. Green, among
many others., And he also adds, [t]he importance of
consensus on ends as part of the process of making judgments on
matters of social welfare has been stressed by economists of
both the Left and Right persuasions.[-5]
Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan (1962) have argued that
unanimity rule should be adopted as a collective choice rule. In
their book, The Calculus of Consent, they apply certain economic
concepts to argue for the unanimity rule. In economic, the costs
which are involuntarily imposed to us by the action of others are
referred to as negative externalities.] Negative
externalities, essentially violate individual rights and
cause disadvantage to others. Tullock and Buchanan argue that
each individual is in the best position to judge whether others'
actions cause them a negative externalities. Therefore, they
claim that the unanimity rule is best to protect individuals'
right. If a certain policy is costly to someone, that individuals
can simply veto it. Since every individual has a veto power, only
those policies which do not produce external costs to anyone will
be implemented. They argue that there is a direct relation
between loss of utility and the majority rule. A simply majority
rule is the least effective in preventing negative externalities;
an absolute majority rule will be more effective, the unanimity
rule will guarantee no external costs at all. This argument can
be summarized in the table below:
External
Costs
0 1 N+l N (unanimity)
Decision Rule
In the figure, the X-axis represents the inclusiveness of
the decision rule. The least inclusive decision rule is• 11. This
rule says that a policy will be implemented if only a simple
individual prefers it. When the decision rule is at 'N', the
decision rule is at the extreme inclusive position. This is the
unanimity rule, which includes the total number of individuals in
the society as a decisive set. The curve slopes down toward the
right represents the external costs decline as it approaches
unanimity. Tulloak and Buchanan assume that a certain amount of
disagreement exists at all time, thus the more inclusive the
decision rule is, the lower will be the external costs. The merit
of unanimity rule is that it is the best way to guarantee the
rights of every individual from the infringement of others since
every individual is empowered to veto whatever policies against
thir own interests.
Tullock and Buchanan, however, realize that it is difficult
to achieve unanimity in most situations. When there is
disagreement and conflicts, time and effort are necessary to
persuade those opposers. Such time and effort are in fact costs
for making decision. The persuasion process consume resources and
will decrease the utility generated from a policy. Tullock and
Buchanan show that this costs can be reduced by replacing the
unanimity rule by less inclusive decision rule. The decision
cost decreases as the inclusiveness of the decision rule decline.
This point can be expressed in graphic form as below:
Decision
Costs
0 1 N+l N (unanimity)
Decision Rule
It can be seen that decision cost curve slopes upward as the
inclusiveness of the decision rule towards unanimity. The optimum
decision rule will depend on the importance of the potential
external costs and the potential decision costs. It can be said
that the more homogeneous the society is, the more desirable will
it be for the society to adopt a more inclusive decision rule.
The existence of decision cost makes it reasonable to choose a
decision rule other than unanimity rule. Nevertheless, Tullock
and Buchanan are claiming that in a world without decision cost,
unanimity rule is desirable, it should be an ideal decision rule
for us to pursue. However, it has been pointed out that unanimity
rule will easily lead to tyranny of a minority. Since only a
unanimously preference is achieved can a policy be implemented,
any change from status quo is impossible even there is only a
single individual who opposes to the change. It means that the
society will prefer status quo when a single individual wants it
regardless what the preferences of the rest of the society. It
may be another form of dictatorship. Sen has made a comment.
When there is a unanimity of views on some issue, clearly this
provides a very satisfactory basis for choice. Difficulties in
social choice arise precisely because unanimity does not exist on
many questions. What do we do then? One answer is to insist on
unanimity for a change, and if there is no such unanimity for any
proposed change, then to stick to the status quo. The rule for
social choice then can be summed up thus: Given that some prefer
an alternative x to the status quo y and no one regards x to be
worse than y, x is socially preferred to y; and when this
condition is not satisfied, the status quo y is preferred to the
other alternative x. This method is one of supreme conservatism.
Even a single person opposing a change can block it altogether no
matter what everybody else wants.|- 7 j Arrow also says,
Buchanan and Tullock, on the other hand, distinguish between
retaining and hanging the status quo most clearly in the
following quotation: We must sharply differentiate between two
kinds of decisions: (1) the positive decision that authorizes
action for the social group, and (2) the negative decision that
effectively blocks action proposed by another group. If a group
is empowered to make decisions resulting in positive action
byfor the whole group, we shall say that this group effectively
'rules' for the decisions in question. It does not seem
meaningful to say that the power to block action constitutes
effective 'rule.'... The power of blocking action is not what we
normally mean, or should mean, when we speak of 'majority rule'
or 'minority rule.' The asymmetry .between action and inaction is
closely related to their support of unanimity as the ideal
criterion of choice; under such a rule, the status quo is a
highly privileged alternative. j- g j
I think, although unanimity rule is not desirable in
selection of policies, it may be justified in a higher level of
selection. That is, the selection of fundamental principles
concerning the formation of a society, such as procedures
for collective choice and constitutions. This is in a higher
order in the sense that they are the rules of the game'.
These principles must be universally endorsed by every members
before they can determine which policies or candidates should be
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the social choice. The necessary condition for an individual to
be a member of a society is that he agrees with the constitution
and collective choice rules of that society. In the earliest
stage of the formation of a society, those who does not agree to
the 'rules of the game' will not join into that society.j-gj
Therefore, the problem of dictatorship to block the formation of
a society simply does not exist in a pre-societal stage. The
requirement of procedural unanimity is justified since it is the
foundation of a society. Moreover, it might be advisable to
propose an unanimously 'acceptable' rather than an unanimously
preferred for an alternative. The requirement of unanimously
'preferred' is too demanding. An requirement for unanimously
'acceptable' will be less demanding. It is because an unanimously
preferred option implies that an option is acceptable while an
acceptable option does not necessarily imply that it is
unanimously preferred. One can accept an alternative which is
contrary to his own preference. The acceptance can be based on
deliberate consideration that the option is the best offer under
the circumstances.
In conclusion, I have argued that unanimity is a sufficient
condition but not a necessary and sufficient condition for a
social shoice. Unanimity rule can only be justified in the
selection of fundamental principles for a society. Since Arrow's
Pareto Principle only requires that a social choice mechanism
must guarentee that unanimity is a sufficient condition for a
social choice, I think it presents no problem as a requirement
for a social shoice mechanism.
CHAPTER SIX
NONDICTATORSHIP
This is Arrow's Condition V for a social choice mechanism.
It says that no single individual in a society should be
permitted to determine the social outcomes regardless of the
preferences of others. This condition is obvious, otherwise, the
choice cannot be a social choice. However, Strasnick (1976)
has suggested that the violation of this condition, in certain
situation, is ethically justifiable and there is nothing wrong to
allow an individual to be decisive for certain social preference.
Strasnick argues that individuals should not be treated
equally in determining a social choice. The preference of the
least advantaged individuals should be given priority. This can be
justified by Rawls's maximin principle. This principle says that
any policy must work to the advantage of the least advantaged
members of the society.[1] In a social choice situation,
Strasnick claims that the task is to pick up an alternative which
would maximize the benefits of the worst-off individual.
Strasnick's argument can be illustrated by an example:
Suppose in a choice setting with two individuals, say
individual 1 and 2, and three alternatives x, y, and z, we have
the following preference profiles:
Individuals Alternatives
From the above preference profiles, individual 1 prefers x
to y, and individual 2 prefers y to x. There are two exactly
opposite preferences, therefore, the society should declare
indifferent among x and y. i.e. xIy (1)
Since both individual 1 and 2 prefer y to z, by Pareto
principle the social preference should be ..P„ (2)
From (1) and (2), and by transitivity, we get the social
preference XPZ (3)
Since only individual 1 prefers x to z, while individual 2
prefers z to x, we conclude that individual 1 is almost decisive
over x to y. i.e. xDy (4)
Obviously this result violates Arrow's condition of
nondictatorship. According to Arrow, this social outcome is
undesirable and should not be permitted.
Strasnick, however, argues that the above result is
justifiable if information about preferences priority, which is
morally relevant information, is taken into consideration for the
determination of a social choice.[2] A judgment of preference
priority is an interpersonal judgment about the moral status of
individual preferences. Fforeover, an interpersonal judgment will
presumably require some kind of intrapersonal comparison.
In the binary comparisons, x vs. y, and x vs. z ,and y vs. z.
Individual 1 orders xply' xplz' yplz individual 2
orders yP2x' zP2x' yP2z If each individual had a
choice of winning on only one binary contest, individual 1 will
choose to win on either x vs. y, or x vs. z since his first
choice is x. Individual 2 will choose to win on either y vs. x or
y vs. z since his first choice is y. Moreover, individual 1
should prefers winning on x vs. z rather than x vs. y, since he
has more to lose if z wins than if y wins for z is individual l's
third choice. Similarly, individual 2 should prefer winning in the
binary contest y vs. x than in y vs. z for x is his third choice.
From these reasoning, we can make an intrapersonal preference
priority as follow:
For individual 1, x?lz7 xPly 7 yPlz-
For individual 2, yP2x7 yP2z 7 zP2x-
(The symbol• 7' reads 'is more important than')
We can see that individual 1 is concerned more with the
outcome XPZ than individual 2 does. Individual 2 has least
preference for z over x, hence, if the social choice is vPr,,
it will cause little harm to individual 2. The social outcome
XPZ, thus can be justified on the ground that it gives
individual 1 that he wants most and is the outcome that
individual 2 cares least.
We can reach the same argument by interpersonal comparison
of utility. For the alternatives x and y, x is individual l's
first choice, y is individual 2's first choice. Strasnick assumes
that, in terms of utility, x would provide individual 1 with the
same utility as y would provide individual 2. It means that the
utility produced by the winning of either one's first choice is
the same. Put it in symbols, it means xi==Y2 Strasnick also
assumes that the utility of losing is the same for each
individual. That is, y-x2. The utility received by
individual 1 when y is the outcome is the same as the utility for
individual 2 when x is the outcome That is, y-2
Given these assumptions, we have the following interpersonal
comparison:
This means that x and y have a higher utility for individual
1 and 2 respectively than z for individual 2, and z has a higher
utility for individual 2 than x has. Moreover, the utility of x
for individual 2 is equal to the utility of y for individual 1,
and the utility of y for individual 1 has greater utility than z
has. From these set of relations and by transitivity, we have
We can see that individual 2 receives
from x, his lowest preference, is greater than the utility which
individual 1 receives from z, his lowest preference. By having
the social choice to be x over z is less harmful than, the social
choice to be z over x. Individual 1 has more to gain than
individual 2 if his preference is satisfied, and more to lose if
it is not. Since we are choosing that preference which maximizes
the utility of the worst-off individual, by Rawls's maximin
principle, the social choice, is ethically justifiable.
I think, Strasnick's preference priority method at most can
apply to situations where individuals are choosing among
policies which have distributive effects to them. However, when
individuals are choosing among candidates for a position where
the benefits are going to the candidate, not to the choosers, the
preference priority procedure would be inapplicable.
Moreover, I think Strasnick's major problem is that if we
allow an individual is decisive in one pair of alternatives, he
will then be decisive in all pairs,of alternatives as we have
proved previously. It means that the individual not only is
decisive in the pair he would otherwise be worst-off, but also is
decisive in all other pairs. This consequence is unacceptable.
I think the violation of the nondictatorship requirement
will make the choice thus obtained the choice of an individual
only, not a social choice at all.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE NOTION OF RATIONALITY
As I have already mentioned, Arrow's conception of
rationality is the same at the individual and collective level.
Both of which has to fulfill Axiom I and Axiom II. [l]t will be
assumed that individuals are rational, by which is meant that the
ordering relations R satisfy Axiom I and Axiom II. The problem
will be to construct an ordering relation for society as a whole
that will also reflect rational choice-making so that R may also
be assumed to satisfy Axiom I and Axiom II•[ i] Arrow's
requirement that individual preferences should be connected and
transitive is referred to as his condition of individual
rationality. His requirement that group preferences is connected
and transitive is referred to as his condition of collective
rationality.
The question now I try to raise is that: Why should we
accept Arrow's definition of rationality? Does the notion of
Arrow's rationality capture the ordinary sense of this term?
In ordinary sense, to act rationally means to give reasons
to support an action. As has been suggested by Peter C.
Ordeshook, In the case of human action, to give a reason is to
demonstrate that the actors acted as if they were seeking to
achieve a particular goal.j-2] Thus, rationality can mean the
selection of means to achieve an end. An individual is rational
if he selects the best means (the most effective, efficient,
etc. method) available to him to achieve his goal. A judgment of
rationality or irrationality is thus a judgment about the causal
relation between an action considered as a means and a given end.
But if there are more than one end to achieve, and these
ends may or may not be compatible with others, then we have to
make a choice among the ends. Before making a choice about means,
compatibility among ends must be ensured since conflicting ends
cannot be attained simultaneously. This is the requirement of
consistency among the ends. Even in the set of compatible ends,
we may have to set a priority in case we have to abandon some
ends for a practical reason. In this sense, a judgment of
rationality and irrationality is a judgment about the logical
relation (consistency, ranking) among alternatives.j-gj
From the above discussion, we notice that the conception of
rationality in ordinary sense has at least two meanings:
First, the selection of best means to achieve desired ends;
Second, the consistency among the ends.
Arrow's definition of rationality is incomplete. He only
restricts his definition in a very narrow sense that a choice is
rational if it is consistent. (The Axiom I and II is exactly the
condition of consistency. We shall see this point later.)
However, I shall examine both the individual and the group
level to see whether the same notion of rationality may apply.
Moreover, I shall also evaluate the condition of consistency, to
see if it is a necessary, sufficient or necessary and sufficient
condition for a rational choice.
The assessment will be divided into two parts. The
individual level and the group level.
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Rationality Principle at the Individual Level
The Axiom of connectivity allows an individual either
prefers one to the other or be indifferent between them. For two
alternatives x and y, there are only three logically possible
relations. The relations are xPy xiy an3 yx; Therefore, the
classification of XR and yRx is exhaustive. For there is
a choice situation, the preference must fall in either one of the
categories. For a classification, there is no question of its
truth or false. It only exists the question of applicability. I
would show that, the Axiom is not applicable in some cases.
Supposing I want to buy a car, among all alternatives, I
pick out two cars, say, x and y, for my further consideration. I
evaluate them with multi criteria such as price, color, brand
name, style and extra. With respect to price, I prefer x to y.
Considering color, I prefer y to x; but I like car x's style
rather than y's. However, I cannot make up my mind on which car I
should purchase. In this situation, I cannot said to be
indifferent among x and y[4]
Now I have been thinking about the choice for more than
one day and still cannot make up my mind. In order to solve the
problem and save my time, I flip a coin to determine which car I
should buy. Since I resort to a randomizing method to make
choice. It seems that I am indifferent between car x and y.
Although finally I decide to choose car x. Does it mean that I
prefer x to y? According to Axiom I, if I finally choose x rather
than y, I am presumed to hold that x is at least as good as y.
i.e. xRy. How does the axiom help us to distinguish the
situation of choosing x to y; and, the situation in which x and
y is indifferent but x is chosen because I have to choose
something, and the situation in which I have preferences among x
and y with multi criteria but seems to be indifferent since I
cannot make up my mind? I think the axiom has little use.
The second axiom proposes by Arrow is the principle of
transitivity. It says that if x is at least as good as y and y is
at least as good as z, then, we will infer that x is at least as
good as z. The axiom applies to a choice over three alternatives.
In a logical system, a proposition is an axiom if and only
if it is a fundamental hypothesis, and it cannot be derived from
other propositions in the system.
Arrow claims that the principle of transitivity is an axiom.
This means that Axiom II is independent, and fundamental. However,
I shall try to show that it is not the case. The principle of
transitivity can be derived from Axiom I alone. It means that the
principle of transitivity is neither independent nor fundamental;
it is only a theorem. Hence, the 'Axiom II' is not an axiom at
all and should be considered as redundant.
Now I try to prove the following proposition by the method
of contradiction.r c n
For all x, y, and z, xRy and yRz imply XRZ.
This is exactly the principle of transitivity.
We first postulate the following definition:
Definition 1: xPy is defined to mean not y-
The statement xPy is read x is preferred to y-[6]




Assume conditions 1, 2 and 3 are consistent. From a
consistent preferences profile, we can make a choice among three
alternatives, say, x, y and z.
Step 1
Now supposing that an individual 1 chooses alternatives x.
It will mean he rejects y and z. Hence we have the preference
profile: not yRx and not ZRX.
However, this preference profile violates condition 3 that
zx
Hence, individual 1 cannot choose alternative x (1)
Step 2
Assuming that individual 1 chooses alternatives y and
rejects x and z. This means that: not xRy and not zRy.
This preference profile is a violation of condition 1 that
xy
Therefore, individual 1 cannot choose alternative y (2)
Sten 3
Now considering that individual 1 chooses alternative z and
rejects x and y. i.e. not XRZ and not Rz.
However, it violates condition 2 that yRz.
Hence, individual 1 cannot choose alternatives z (3)
Step 4
From the result (1), (2) and (3) above, we conclude that the
individual 1 cannot choose among the three alternatives x, y and
z. It means that our assumption that the preferences profile:
xV, YRz and zx are consistent is false. That is,
condition 1, 2 and 3 are inconsistent.
Among the three conditions, condition 1 and 2 are given.
Therefore, our assumption that ZRX holds, must be false, i.e.
n°t ZRK- From definition 1, it is equivalent to XPZ.
We thus obtain xRy and yRz imply XPZ (4)
From definition 1 and Axiom I, XPZ imply XRZ (5)
Combining the results of (4) and (5), we get:
xRy and Rz imply XRZ.
We thus have proved the principle of transitivity can be
derived from the Axiom I alone.
We can see that Axiom I is the sufficient condition for the
principle of transitivity. Rejection of the principle of
transitivity will also mean the abandon of the Axiom I.
Therefore, the attack on the principle of transitivity will mean
the attack against both the Axiom I and 'Axiom II'. In other words,
Arrow's conception of rationality is put in doubt.
C. Dykes [7] has distinguished three different types of
preferences, which can facilitate us to illustrate that the
violation of transitivity, in some cases, is not irrational.
The three types of preferences are:
(1) A pure preference: A preference which has no reason to
support.
(2) A reasoned preference: A preference which is supported
by reasons.
(3) A all-things-considered preferences: A preference which
is arrived after a deliberated weighting and
calculation of all relevant factors and consequences.
With the help of C. Dyke's distinction between different
types of preferences, I shall try to illustrate that in some
cases, an intransitive preference is not necessarily irrational.
Case 1: In pure preference.
People may choose simply out of an impulse. In the presence
of alternatives x and y, the individual chooses x out of impulse
1. While comparing y and z, that individual prefers y out of
impulse 2. When facing x and z, the individual selects z out of
impulse 3. In the presence of all three alternatives, impulse 1,
2 and 3 simultaneously appear. The three impulses may be
disconnected and independent. Therefore, the preferences in the
previous three choice settings are disconnected, and transitivity
becomes impossible and meaningless.
Case 2: In a reasoned preference.
Suppose I am asked to compare three alternatives, x, y and
z. First I have reason to prefer x to y and y to z. However, in
the second round of comparison, I change my mind and rank z over
x. Although the preferences I make in the first and second round
of comparison are inconsistent. I am not irrational since each
preference I make is supported by reason.
Now supposing the time duration for the first round and
the second round comparison is quite short that we can consider
the comparisons performed simultaneously. It means that after I
make a preference for x to y and y over z, within a split of
second, I change my mind and rank z over x.
The above intransitivity should not be viewed as irrational.
Since every choice is a rational choice in the sense that they
are supported by reason.
Vfe should notice that in reality, all choices must be taken
within certain time. However, the principle of transitivity says
nothing about the time dimension. The above two cases illustrate
one important point, that the principle of transitivity only
applies when the state of mind of an individual is stable,
is using the same criteria for the ranking of alternatives in a
certain duration of time in which choice actions are taken.
Intransitivity can also occur in the domain of probabilistic
reasoning. Suppose there are three perfectly fair dice. Die
A's six faces are 6, 6, 6, 2, 2, 2; Die B's are 5, 5, 4, 3, 3, 2;
and Die C's are 6, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3.j-q
It can be calculated that rolling two die at a time, say die
A and die B, on any given roll, the probability of A beating B is
612, the probability of B beating A is 512. We can see that the
probability of A beats B is higher than B beats A. Therefore, it
is rational to bet on A against B. i,e.APg.
When rolling die B and die C, the probability of B beating C
is 1436, the probability of C beating B is 1336. Hence, it is
rational to bet on B against C. i.e. bPq.
When rolling die C and A, the probability of C beating A is
612, the probability of A beating C is 512. Undoubtedly it is
rational to bet on C against A. i.e. qP«
In the long run, for a rational gambler, it will be wise to
bet on A against B, B against C and C against A. Again, the
principle of transitivity does not hold.
From the above example, we can notice that, in face of
uncertainty about the outcome, in some cases transitivity does
not hold. Therefore, the violation of the transitivity in some
situations need not be considered as irrational.
A pyschologist, A. Tversky has suggested that we should
defined the notion of transitivity in terms of probability since
individuals are not perfectly consistent in their choices when
faced with repeated choices.j-gj In A. Tversky's probabilistic
version of transitive preference, which he terms as weak
stochastic transitivity, WST, the validity of the transitivity
principle is conditional. That is, the preferences must first
fulfill certain condition before we can draw a transitive
preference from them. I think his probabilistic version of
transitive preference can also be applied in choice setting
involved probabilistic calculation. I shall reformulate his
version and present in the following way: Suppose P(x, y) is the
probability of x beating y when both x and y are present, and
P(y, x) is the probability of y beating x when both x and y are
present. Under the condition P(x, y)+ P(y, x)= 1 holds (i.e.
either x beats y or y beats x). Preference may be defined by
if and only if P(x, y) for all variables x and y.
For three alternatives, x, y, and z;
P(x,y) 7% and P(y, z) imply P(x, z) if the
conditions P(x, y)+ P(y, x)= 1, P(y, z)+ P(z, y)= 1, and
P(x, z)+ P(z, x)= 1, hold.
This is the notion of weak stochastic transitivity.
Since preference is defined by xPy if P(x, y) 7h, for
all variables x and y. Therefore, the principle of transitivity
can be restated as:
For all x, y, z, xy and yz imply xz
the condition of connectivity holds. (Since P(x, z)+ p(z, x)= 1
implies either P(x, y)%or P(y, x) 7 h- It means either
xRy or' holds. This is exactly the condition of
Axiom I.)
Comparing this reformulated version of the principle of
transitivity with the one originally proposed by Arrow, which he
suggests as the Axiom II, we can notice that the truthness of
Axiom I implies the truthness of the principle of transitivity.
Therefore, Axiom I is the sufficient condition for the principle
of transitivity. Again, this is another evident to prove that
'Axiom II' is a theorem only.
In the above case, we can notice that the condition
P(x, y)+ P(y, x)= 1 does not hold. For die A and B and C,
P(WAB)+P(WBA)=0-916; P(Wbc)+P(Wcb)=0.749; PWCA)+
p(WaC)=0.920 Therefore, no transitive preference can be
obtained. (Where 'PCW)' reads 'the probability of A beating
B.')
Recalling the fact that the principle of transitivity is the
necessary condition for connectivity (that is the requirement of
consistency), thus the violation of the principle of transitivity
means the violation of the condition of consistency. We conclude
that consistency among preferences is not a necessary condition
for a choice to be rational.
In view of means-end efficiency as the notion of
rationality, the condition of consistency is obviously not a
sufficient condition for a rational choice.
From the above analysis we thus conclude that the condition
of consistency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for a rational choice at the individual level.
Rationality Principle at the Group Level
According to Arrow, collective rationality bears the same
notion of individual rationality. Therefore, I suppose the same
conception can be used for us to understand what collective
rationality really means as suggested by Arrow.
If we use the same notion of rationality at the individual
level to define the rationality at the group level, we may define
collective rationality as:
1. A social choice is rational if the society selects the
best means or choice to achieve certain social ends.
2. A social choice is rational if choices of the society are
consistent, (here the term society is used in its broad
sense, it means, any organized group of people.|-qj)
We should notice that society is not an organism cable of
making its own choice. We say a society has a choice is an
anthropomorphic expression. The choice of a society is merely the
outcome of a social choice mechanism with individual preferences
as the input. Can we assess the means-end relations of a group to
see whether a social choice is rational or not, just the same way
as at the individual level? First of all, in order to find the
best means, we have to define what the goal is. An individual
could have a clear mind of what he wants so that he can decide
which choice should be made for the best realization of his end.
It presents no difficulty for an individual to define his end.
However, for a society, the social ends are not known.
As Arrow is an individualist, he will insist that a social
choice should and only should be based on individual preferences.
Moreover, he also stipulates the condition of citizens
sovereignty as a 'reasonable condition' for an aggregation
device.
Clearly Arrow will deny any apriori social end which is
unrelated to individual's preferences. The 'social end', unlike
the end of an individual, cannot be known in advance. It is
possible of being known only after all the preferences of the
individuals of the society have been processed through a
social choice mechanism. Therefore it is meaningless to view
the collective rationality from the means-end efficiency
perspective.
Arrow defines the notion of collective rationality by Axiom
I and II. In fact, the two axioms uphold the condition of
consistency. Thus collective rationality can be interpreted as
the consistency among a set of social choices which are based on
the same set of individual orderings of a society. Arrow's
interest is to find a social choice mechanism which can guarantee
consistency among social orderings. Therefore, [t]he problem
will be to construct an ordering relation for society as a whole
that will also reflect rational choice-making so that R may also
be assumed to satisfy Axiom I and II.j--Qj After having clarified
the concept of collective rationality, the remaining guestion is
that: Why should the condition of consistency be desirable for
social orderings? Arrow seems to think that it is obvious and
need not provide any answer. However, I shall argue that the
condition of consistency is not necessary. Moreover, this
requirement is the violation of values proposed in a pluralistic
society.
Peter C. Fishburn (1970) has suggested that social
transitivity is not necessarily a desirable condition for a
collective choice mechanism. He shows that in certain situations,
a social outcome which violates Arrow's principle of
transitivity at the group level appears to be acceptable and
reasonable•[i2]
Let us consider Fishburn's example.
Suppose there are three candidates x, y and z competing in
an election; and there are 21 voters. The preferences profile for
the 21 voters are listed below:
VOTERS RANK ORDER OF CANDIDATES
1st 2nd 3rd
1 to 10 x z y
11 to 20 y x z
21 z (x and y is indifferent)
Ws can see that candidate x receives ten first-place votes,
eleven second-place votes. Candidate y receives ten first-place
votes, one second-place votes and ten third-place votes.
Candidate z receives only one first-place vote, ten second-place
votes and ten third-place votes. Among the voters, ten have the
preference ordering XPZ and zPy; ten have yPx and XPZ,
and one has ZPX and xIy.
Fishburn argues that it is reasonable for candidate x to be
the winner even though that candidate does not have a majority of
the first-place votes. It is because candidate x has ten
first-place votes and eleven second-place votes. Candidate y
only has ten first-place votes and one second-place vote. For
candidate z, he only receives one first-place vote and ten
second-place votes.
In the above election, although there is no Condorcet
winner since no candidates beats every others in a pairwise
contest. If we replace the Condorcet criterion by a less
stringent one: the extension condition, there will be a winner.
The extension condition says that a candidate is a winner if he
defeats most of the other candidates and tie with the rest in a
pairwise contest. According to extension condition, candidate x
should be the winner since he defeats z and ties y, and is the
only candidate beats most and tie the rest of other candidates.
On the assumption that candidate x should be the winner in
the election, let us consider whether social transitivity holds
in this case.
From the given preference profile of voters, we can get the
following social orderings:
(i) Since 20 voters prefer x to z, the social preference should
xPz
(ii) Since 11 voters prefer z to y, the social preference should
be zPy»
(iii)Since x ties with y, the social orderings should be xIy
From (ii) and (iii) and by the principle of social
transitivity, we have ZPX. However this contradicts to (i)
that the social preference is XPZ.
Thus we can see that social transitivity does not hold even
though we have reson to consider candidate x to be the winner in
this case. This means that consistency is not a necessary
condition for a social choice mechanism.
The requirement of consistency among social orderings also
violates some values upheld by a pluralistic society.
For example, in a populistic democratic society as defined
by Robert A. Dahl.
DEFINITION 1: An organization is democratic if and only
if the process of arriving at government policy is
compatible with the condition of popular sovereignty and
the condition of political equality.
DEFINITION 2: The condition of popular sovereignty is
satisfied if and only if it is the case that whenever
policy choices are perceived to exist, the alternative
selected and enforced as governmental policy is the
alternative most preferred by the members.
DEFINITION 3: The condition of political equality is
satisfied if and only if control over governmental
decisions is so shared that, whenever policy alternatives
are perceived to exist, in the choice of the alternative to
be enforced as government policy, the preference of each
member is assigned an equal value.
DEFINITION 4: THE RULE: The principle of majority rule
prescribes that in choosing among alternatives, the
alternative preferred by the greater number is selected.
That is, given two or more alternatives x, y, etc., in
order for x to be government policy it is a necessary and
sufficient condition that the number who prefer x to any
alternative is greater than the number who prefer any
single alternative to x. 3]
In a pluralistic society, individuals are allowed to have
different values and different preferences. Their preferences are
assigned an equal value. It is permissible for every individuals
in that society to have exactly different preference profile.
Under a populistic society, citizens may divide into equal groups
and prefer differently among alternatives. Suppose there are
three candidates x, y, and z, and the citizens divide into three
ecrual groups as follows:
Group A prefers x to y, and y to z, and x to z.
Group B prefers y to z, and z to x, and y to x.
Group C prefers z to x, and x to y, and z to y.
We can notice that this is the preference profiles for a
voting paradox. Thus under a populistic democratic society, an
inconsistent social orderings can be obtained.
The inconsistent social outcomes may just be a reflection of
the diversified and equal divisions of preferences of citizens.
Every citizen can make their free choices according to their own
tastes. Therefore, inconsistent social orderings are permissible.
If the inconsistent social outcomes are termed as 'irrational',
then, it is equivalent to say that diversity and equality of
values of preferences are undesirable and unacceptable.
Arrow, as an individualist, intends to construct a social
welfare function to fulfill certain conditions which he think
to be reasonable. If we look closer into these conditions, we
can find that they express the very belief of populistic
democracy. |-14j Thus, Arrow's individualist outlook should be
in line with inconsistent social orderings. Arrow's position, on
the one hand, is an individualist while on the other hand,
suggests that only consistent social orderings can be said to be
collectively rational, appears to be self contradictory.
As has been commented by Amartya K. Sen, Arrow's
impossibility theorem is precisely a result of demanding social
orderings (the requirement of consistency) as opposed to choice
functions. [15] R- Veihl has also added, [b]ecause
Arrow, assumes transitivity of collective choice as a criterion
of rational social action, it is worth noting that under almost
any theory of democratic politics, and certainly under the one in
question here (the populistic democracy), the requirement of
transitivity would be irrational in a great many types of
collective choices....clearly it would lead to irrational results
in a democracy to require transitivity in collective
choices. r
Although we can argue that violation of social transitivity
is not unreasonable, and inconsistency among social orderings
should be permitted in view of upholding the values of populistic
democracy. However, there remains an important practical problem
unsolved. In case of inconsistent social orderings arise, what
should be the social choice? I think some inconsistency-breaking
mechanism should be introduced. But how should we design this
inconsistency-breaking mechanism? We may, however, get some ideas
from the tie-breaking mechanism in rules of meeting.
A tie vote on a motion means that the same number of members has
voted in the affirmative as in the negative. Since a majority
vote, or more than half of the legal votes cast, is required to
pass a motion, an equal or tie vote means that the motion is lost
because it has failed to receive a majority vote. A tie vote on a
motion is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply
not a majority vote and the motion is lost. A tie vote that
constitutes a deadlock that must be resolved can occur only when
two or more candidates, or two or more alternative propositions,
are being voted on at the same time and two or more of them
received the same number of votes. Then no candidate has been
elected, and no proposal has been adopted. Such a tie vote
results in a deadlock, and the vote must be retaken until the tie
is resolved by voting or by some other method which the assembly
may choose•[i7]
In some committee, whenever a tie is observed, the chairman
in the committee is entitled to have a casting votes to break the
tie. By casting vote...what is meant is a second vote
exercisable by the chairman of a meeting in addition to his own
vote as a member.|- g j
In a voting paradox, there is an evenly distributed votes
among different preferences profile, if we regard it as equal
groups of individuals voting for exactly different motion, then
the situation is just the same as in a tie voting. j-19]
Therefore, whenever there is a paradox of voting, we can simply
declare all the alternatives are socially indifferent to each
other, and follow tie-breaking mechanism to break the paradoxical
situation.
In the case of tie voting, we can either re-vote for those
motions until the tie is resolved; or we can entitle the chairman
to have a casting vote. The second measure seems preferable since
it is more time saving. However, this measure appears to violate
the condition of political equality. But, is the infringement
negligible? In order to find out the answer, let us consider the
situation below:
A committee consists of four members, say, x, y, z, and w.
Moreover, x is the chairman of the committee. In the committee,
each member has one vote. Whenever a tie is noted, the chairman
will be empowered to break the tie. The question is: How much
voting power do the chairman have more than other committee
members? Voting power may be defined as the chance that a given
individual's vote will be crucial to the decision voted by the
body. We use shapley-Shubik index to measure the voting power of
every individuals in the committee.
In an abstract setting, we would not have apriori knowledge
about possible orders of coalition formation. Shapley and Shubik
propose that to measure abstract voting power, we should consider
all orders equally likely. A member is said to be pivotal, if the
losing coalition will become winning only when that member joins
it. It means that the pivotal member holds the power. Supposing a
motion is put, y strongly supports the motion, w also support
the motion. Obviously y and w will join a coalition in support of
the motion. At this point, the motion would still lose. The
losing coalition will be able to win only if it can gain the
support from the third member. Hence the third member has the
crucial power in this situation. If z strongly opposes to the
motion and x is indifferent, then x is the pivotal member.
In the following analysis of voting power, we assume that
the probability of all orders of coalition formation are equally
likely.
For a committee with four members there are 4! (i.e. 24)
possible ways of ordering. The ordering is arranged in descending
order of the degree of support. For example, x y_ z w, it means x
strongly support the motion, y is the second most support the
motion, z is indifferent while w strongly opposes the motion. The
pivotal member has been underlined in the ordering. The 24
possible ways of ordering are:
The Shapley-Shubik power indices of the members are thus 12
out of 24 for x, 4 out of 24 for y, z, and w:
We can notice that if the chairman is entitled to have a
casting vote, he will have three times as much power as each of
the other committee members. This measure severely infringes the
condition of political equality.
Therefore, a re-voting method may be more reasonable for the
inconsistency-breaking mechanism. The paradox of voting may still
occur in the consecutive voting. However, after bargaining and
lobbying among the members, I think the occurrence of the paradox
will be practically insignificant. However, some may argue that
the paradox may still persist in several consecutive re-voting
and create a practical problem. In this situation, what should we
do?
The above situation is only logically possible, however, is
implausible. But if it is really the case, we may employ some
randomizing methods as a last resort to dissolve the paradox,
say, by throwing a fair die or drawing of lots. Some may
challenge these methods as unreasonable and arbitrary. In
responding to this attack, I shall first recall the very notion
of rational choice.
A choice is said to be rational if it is guided by reason or
principles. Whenever a choice is guided by principles or reason,
it is a rational choice. In normal situations, social choices are
guided by the principle of majority. They are principle guided
choices and hence are collective rational. However, in the case
of inconsistency among social orderings, the majority principle
should have to be set aside and other means are employed. As I
have argued previously that the alternatives for a society should
be declared indifferent to each other when paradox occurs for
we have no reason to say any alternative should be preferred. All
alternatives thus should be assigned an egual value for the
society, and each alternative should have an egual probability to'
be the choice of the society. A randomizing method is used
because it uphold both the condition of political equality and
the principle of fairness. They are the fundamental principles we
have to recognize. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to use a
randomizing method to dissolve a paradox. Moreover, there is in
fact a rule that governed the social outcome. The decision rule
is that: A choice is the choice of the society if and only if it
is obtained by a perfectly fair randomizing method. It can hardly
be denied that the choice from a randomizing method is also a
rule governed choice.
In conclusion, I suggest in this chapter that inconsistency
of social orderings is permissible. Whenever inconsistent social
orderings are observed, re—voting is a reasonable measure to be
taken. As a last resort, a randomizing method can be introduced.
Under a repeated paradoxical situation, a randomizing method is
well justified and acceptable. Therefore, inconsistent social
choices are ethically justifiable by populistic democratic theory
and also practically dissolvable by a re-voting and randomizing
method. The condition of consistency, which I have already argued,
is not a necessary condition for a social choice mechanism.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONDITIONS FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In previous chapters I have assessed the bases of reasons for
Arrow's conditions as a social choice rules. In the following
chapters I want to explore a wide range of electoral systems
currently practised in democratic countries to see whether these
systems satisfy the minimum requirements proposed by Arrow. The
analysis performed may be rather formal, therefore, some
mathematical notations and more precise definition for Arrow's
conditions will be given as a preparation for our further
discussions.
§8.1 Preliminary Notations and Definitions
First we set forth the following notations:
1. X is the universal set of alternatives, which is a nonempty
finite set.
2. S is a nonempty subset of X, to be interpreted as the set of
alternatives that are currently available, is called an
opportunity set or the choice environment.
3. is an ordering of X held by individual i
4. Rs is the relation R over a subset of X.
5. R is a social ordering on X.
6. Rs is the relation R over a subset of X.
7. Pi is the strict relation corresponding to R, xPiy
to be called x is strictly preferred to y by individual i.
8. P is the strict relation corresponding to R, xPy to be
called x is strictly preferred to y by the society.
g, u ig preference profile for a set of individuals, i.e.
12. F is the social choice rule which governs the selection of a
social choice mechanism, e.g. Arrow's conditions.
13. C is the social choice mechanism, which is a function of a
social choice rule. i.e. C=F(u) e.g. electoral systems
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14. C(u, S) is the choice set of S with respect to u by the
social choice mechanism C.
15. N is the number of individuals in the choice environment.
16. N(xRy) is the number of individuals i N for whom x is
being preferred to y.
17. V is the total votes returned in any constituency in an
election.
18. t is any single individual or party's share of the total vote.
19. M is the total seats assigned to any constituency.
§8-2 Social Choice Rules for the Assessement of Electoral Systems;
A Reformulation of Arrow's Conditions
In the context of Arrow's impossibility theorem, several
conditions are being put as reasonable social choice rules
for any social choice mechanism. They may now be summarized in
the following:
(A) There are at least three individuals in N i.e. N 7 3.
(A2) There are at least three alternatives in X i.e. X 3.
(A3) R is connective: xRy or Rx (or both) for all
x, y6X.
(A) R is transitive: for all x, y, z£ X, if both XR
and yRz, then XRZ.
(A5) Condition U (Unrestricted Domain): This condition means
society's choice must be obtainable from any pattern or
combination of individual orderings. No patterns or
combination of individual orderings can be excluded to
yield a social choice. In other words, the domain of the
social choice function F shall include all possible
combinations of individual orderings in all possible
environment within the universal set of alternatives X.
This condition has two implications: (1) All logically
possible profiles of preference orderings on X are
admissible. (2) All logically possible combination of
alternatives in X are admissible.
(A) Condition I (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives):
For u=[R1, R2,..., Rn] and uR-', R2',...,
Rn'], if R.s=Ri,s then C(u, S)=C(u', S).
(A-y) Condition P( Pareto Principle): For any pair x, y€ X,
if xPy for all individuals i, then xPy.
(Aq) Condition N (nonditatorship Principle): There is no
individual i in the society such that: if __P •then
a iy
xPy for all x, yX.j
Arrow's conditions are, in fact, a set of rules for a social
preference function. (In Arrow's own term, they are conditions
for a social welfare function.) The chosen set for a social
preference function is a social ordering. This is, however,
different from that of social choice function. For a social
choice function C, which assigns to each u and each S, a nonempty
subset, C(u, S) of S is chosen. The chosen set, C(u, S), is a set
of winners, in which ordering is not necessary.
Electoral system, however, is a social choice function, by
which for each voters' preference profile u, and a given set of
candidates S, a winner (or winners) in S isare obtained. In a
single constituency, more than one winner might be declared as a
result of ties. This situation can be resolved by some built in
tie-breaking mechanism in an electoral system.
A social choice function, of course, should also obey certain
elementary rules. To serve our purpose to select an acceptable
electoral system, or exactly it may be called a social choice
function, Arrow's conditions need to be redefined so that we can
identify social choice function conforming to those criteria.
As we have discussed earlier, (A3) entails (A4), and
(A) is in fact the requirement of consistency. Therefore we
can put a social choice rule, Rule C as the rule of consistency
for any social choice mechanism as:
Rule C: A social choice mechanism C is consistent if and
only if: for all x, y€.X, if x£ C(u, [x, y]) and
y€ C(u, [y, z]) then x£C(u, [x, z]). For a staging
social choice mechanism, the consistency condition
can be interpreted as: For xS'CSCX, if x€C(u, S)
then x€C(u, S') (It means that if an alternative is
chosen in a larger choice environment, he will also
be chosen in a smaller choice environment.)] The
reason is: If we have x£ C(u, [x, y, z]), then we
would conclude that x is at least as good as x and
y. But if x£ C(u, [x, y]), it will mean that x is
not at least as good as y. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, x must be an element in C(u, [x, y])
(A), (A2) and (A) can combine together to yield a
requirement on the domain of a social choice mechanism. That is,
the social choice mechanism should respond to all logically
possible combinations of individual orderings in all possible
environments for individuals and alternatives more than three.
This rule can be called Rule U (Rule of Unrestricted Domain):
Rule U: i) 3
ii) X 7 3
iii) the social choice mechanism has a domain as all
logically possible preferences of orderings
on X.
iv) the social choice mechanism has a domain as all
logically possible combinations of alternatives
in X..
Social Choice Rules for Electoral -104- Systems Chapter Eight
It should be noticed that a social choice mechanism is a
function of a social choice rule, and the output of a social
choice mechanism is determined by two variables, namely: the
preference profile for a set of individuals (u), and the choice












A social choice mechanism is said to be independent of
irrelevant alternatives if candidate x in S is declared as a
winner on the basis of comparisons with other members in S, x's
status as winner should not be affected by alternatives outside
the given choice environment S. Thus, we have:
Rule I: For u=[R1, R2••• 3 and u'R-j, ...R],
and for all x6SCX, if Ris=Ri,s and C(u, S)=[x],
then C(u', S)=[x].
(It should be noticed that the chosen set C(u, S),
is interpreted as a set of winners, not a social
ordering.)
Arrow's condition P is restricted in a pairwise comparision
between alternatives, it says, if xPiy for all individuals i
then xPy. It does not necessarily means that x is an element
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in a chosen set for the society since it may be the case that
everyone agrees y is the last and x is the second last to be
preferred. Moreover, maybe there is an alternative, say, z, in S
that everyone prefers to x. Therefore, even though everyone in
the society prefers x to y, it does not necessarily mean that x
should be in the chosen set. It is true only when the choice
environment containing two alternatives. However, it is
reasonable to conclude that y should not be chosen if x is
available. In view of this interpretation, a social choice
mechanism satisfies Pareto Principle if everyone in the society
prefers x to y, then it does not choose y when x is available.
Rule P: In a preference profile u, if xPy for all
individuals i, then y C(u, S) when x£ S.
From Arrow's Condition N, we know that an individual i is
an dictator if VPW then VP_,. But it does not necessarily
a iy Ay
means that x is being chosen since in the social ordering
ranking, y may be ranked as the last and x is the second last.
Both x and y may not be chosen by the society. However, if y is
chosen by the society, x should also be included in the chosen
set. Since only individual i prefers x, therefore i is a
dictator. This is what Condition N prevents. Hence, for a social
choice mechanism satisfies Condition N, it must not choose x
when y is in the chosen set provided only a single individual i
prefers x to y.
Rule N: There is no single individual i in the society
such that xPiy and y£C(u, s) implies x€ C(u, S),
for x, y£ S. It is equivalent to say that: If xPiy
and y€C(u, S) then x£ C(u, S), for x, ye S.
Arrow's impossibility theorem holds when there is more than
three alternatives. However, when there are only two
alternatives, Arrow has proved that it is possible to construct a
social choice mechanism satisfies all the conditions if we relax
condition 1 to allow only two alternatives in the universal set.
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We define a majority decision method as:
M: if and only if N(x, y) N(y, x).[3]
M satisfies Axiom I: It is because either N(x, y) N(y, x)
or N(x, y) N(y, x) holds. It means, either xRy or yl.
M satisfies Axiom II: Since there are only two alternatives,
either z=x or z=y. If z=x, the Axiom becomes: xRy and yR
implies xx Since XRX is equivalent to the proposition
N(x, x) N(x, x). Therefore, it is obviously true. If z=y. the
Axiom becomes xRy and yRy implies xPy. Again, it is
obviously true.
M satisfies condition U: Only two possible ordering of
alternatives: xRy or yR. Thus, M can yield a social
ordering for any preference profile of individuals.
M satisfies condition P: If every individual prefers x to y,
then N(x, y) N(y, x). We thus obtain xRy.
M satisfies condition I: If S=[x, y], then no irrelevant
alternatives in the universal set. If S=[x], then the chosen set
is the entire environment S. No alteration of the chosen set in s
is possible.
M satisfies condition N: Suppose only a single individual
prefers x to y, i.e. N(x, y)=l, and all other individuals not
prefers x to y, i.e. N(y, x) 1. We henceforth obtain:
N(x, y) N(y, x). It means, not xPy-
Arrow suggests a Theorem 1: the Possibility Theorem for Two
Alternatives. It says, [i]f the total number of alternatives is
two, the method of majority decision is a social welfare function
which satisfies Condition 2—5 and yields a social ordering of the
two alternatives for every set of individual orderings.j-j Arrow
also adds. Theorem 1 is, in a sense, the logical foundation of
the Anglo-American Two-party system.]
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Therefore, it is no need to assess electoral systems based
on majority decision rule when the total number of candidates in
the election is only two. The assessments of electoral systems
are on the assumption that the choice environment is containing
more than or equal to three candidates.
Before we start the assessment, let us first have a general
survey of electoral systems currently practised in democratic
countries worldwide.
CHAPTER NINE
GENERAL SURVEY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Arrow has pointed out that there are two kinds of social
choice mechanism. In a capitalist democracy there are
essentially two methods by which social choices can be made:
voting, typically used to make political decisions, and the
market mechanism, typically used to make economic
decisions. j-j Thus, electoral system is a typical social
choice mechanism to make political decisions in democratic
countries.
There are many types of electoral system, but they all
comprise four basic elements: electoral formulas, district
magnitudes, ballot structures and electoral thresholds. The
first one- electoral law, is the key factor governing the
process and consequences of an election. Classification of
electoral systems are mainly according to this dimension. The
second one is the district magnitude. It denotes the number of
candidates to be elected in a district. District magnitude is
neither a geographical area nor the number of voters in it, but
the number of seats assigned to the district. Since fractional
seats do not exist, district magnitude vary as positive integers.
The third element of electoral system is the ballot structure.
There are two types of it: categorical or ordinal. Categorical
ballots ask the voter to decide which one of the parties he
prefers. The ballot forces him to say that he prefers one party
in parliament as opposed to all others. He cannot equivocate; he
cannot qualify his decision.[2] Categorical ballots are the
normal ballots in the sense that they insist that the voter
expresses his preference in a dichotomy, (that is, no rank—order
of candidates) Ordinal ballots allow a voter expresses his
preference in an order. Voters hence can make a rank-order among
candidates or parties. He may thus say that he prefers Party A
most, Party C second, and so forth. The voter need not opt in
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favor of any single contestant.] The last component of
electoral system is the electoral threshold. In order not to
make small parties to win election, all countries have a
threshold established to limit small parties. Electoral threshold
is defined as the minimum number of seats won at the district
level andor a minimum percentage of the total national vote for
having a seat in the parliament.
Electoral systems are the practical aggregation device used
to convert thousands of votes cast by electors into limited seats
in a legislature. Electoral systems can be classified by the way
they allocate seats. Broadly speaking, there are four ways in
which this can be done: Seats allocate to those candidates
obtaining a plurality, or majority of the vote, or semi-
proportionately, or proportionately. Therefore, we have plurality
systems, majority systems, semi-proportional systems and
proportional systems of election.
In addition, there are many methods of allocating seats
proportionately. Their differences are based upon preferential
voting in multi-member constituencies and party lists voting.
Party list systems can be further, subdivided into those which
allocate seats nationally, and those allocation within
multi-member constituencies. They also can further sub-subdivided
according to the methods by which candidates are chosen. An
electoral system may require electors to vote only for a party
list or offer certain degree of choice among candidates within
a party list, or even across party lists. Here, I try to lay out
the various electoral systems as in the figure below:
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A Classification of Electoral Systems
Ficmre 1.
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Figure 3.
A Classification of the Electoral Systems for the Election







































CONDITIONS FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
GENERAL SURVEY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Plurality Systems -112- Chapter Nine
§9.1 Plurality Systems
Plurality system, as it developed in Britain and is used in
countries which have come under British political influences- the
Commonwealth countries. Plurality system, or it can be called the
first-past-the-post system, is the oldest type of electoral
system. It awards a seat to a candidate who gets a plurality of
votes in a given constituency. Plurality system is a
disproportional representation mechanism. It enhances a major
party over-represented in the parliament. Thus it is likely to
yield single-party government without the need for coalitions. In
a simple plurality system, each constituency normally elected a
single member. The plurality system in single-member
constituencies is the simplest to operate. Each elector is
offered a list of candidates on a ballot paper for the relevant
constituency and is asked to select one. The candidate receives
most of the votes is declared elected.
Electoral systems used in a multi-member constituency,
whereby each elector has as many votes as there are candidates to
be elected, is generally known as block vote. This system, is.
used in various local elections in Britain. This is the plurality
system in multi-member constituencies, in which the n candidates
receiving most votes are declared as the winners if n candidates
are to be elected
The distinctive feature of plurality system is that the
share of the vote needed to win a given seat cannot be known in
advance. It depends on the number of candidates and the
distribution of votes among candidates in a given constituency.
§9.2 Majority Systems
Majority systems seek to eliminate the possibility of a
candidate elected on a minority of vote. There are two types of
majority systems: the alternative vote and two—ballot system. In
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the alternative vote system, the winning candidate in a
constituency must secure an absolute majority (i.e. at least one
more vote than 50% of the total). This is a preferential system
in single-member constituencies. Electors are required to rank
alternative candidates in order of preferences. By doing so, an
elector is asked to indicate how he would vote if his favourite
candidate were defeated and he had to choose again among the
remaining candidates. This is the alternative vote.[5] Absolute
majority of votes may be obtained on the first count, but if no
candidate has an absolute majority of the vote, the candidate
with lowest first-preference votes is eliminated and his votes
will be redistributed according to the second preference recorded
on those ballot papers. If this does not produce an absolute
majority, then the next lowest candidate is eliminated and his
votes are redistributed. This process continues until one
candidate has an absolute majority of the vote. The alternative
vote is a method to guarantee majority representation in a
constituency; however, it remains a system of disproportional
representation.
The two-ballot system, as its name implies, after the first
ballot has been held, if no candidate has won an absolute
majority of the vote, a second ballot is performed. The results
of the first ballot determine which candidates in a constituency
may participate in the second ballot. In National Assembly
elections in the Fifth Republic of France, only those candidates
who have gained the votes of more than 12% of the registered
electorate can participate in the second ballot. For presidential
elections, only the two highest ranking candidates can contest
in the second ballot. Both types of the majority system we have
discussed is to elect representatives by an absolute majority of
the votes and are therefore also disproportional in nature.
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The fundamental features of the plurality and majority
systems are that: (1) they are disproportional; (2) the number of
seats which a party receives depends not only upon the number of
votes which it gains, but also the distribution of votes.
Electoral systems used in a single-member constituencies can not
guarantee proportional representation since votes for those
losing candidates are wasted in the sense that these votes bring
no seats.
§9.3 Semi-Proportional Systems
If a elector has votes less than the number of candidates to
be elected in a multi-constituency, then the system of election
in used is known as limited vote. Limited vote is only used in
Japan today. In Japan, each elector has one vote, although
constituencies are multi-member. There is no mechanism for
transferring votes from one candidate to another. Those declared
elected are simply those n candidates receiving most of the votes
in a n-member constituency. This system secure minority
representation in two ways: First, since an elector only has one
vote, candidates coming from the same party are to some extent
have to compete against each other for the single vote form an
elector. In this situation, a minority party will gain
representation if it puts up only one candidate and secures just
over a guarter of the vote in a three-member constituency. (If
four candidates run for three seats, the last one must receive
votes less than a guarter of the total, therefore, anyone secures
a guarter of total votes must not be the last and hence will be
allocated a seat) Second, this system is less disproportional
than plurality or majority systems since it forces even the
strongest party to nominate fewer candidates than there are seats
to be allocated so that its supporting candidates are more likely
to have evenly distribution of votes in a greater proportion of
the total.
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Although the single non-transferable vote facilitates the
representation of minorities, they do not ensure a proportional
relationship between votes and seats. This point can be
illustrated from the 1969 House of Representatives election in
Japan, where each constituency returning three, four or five
members, (with the exception of one single-member constituency
among 130 constituencies in Japan) j-gj
%Votes Seats Seats in pro- Extra %Seats
Won portion to votes Seats
Liberal Democratic P. 47.6 288 232 +56 59.2
Socialists 21.4 90 104 -14 18.5
Democratic Socialist P. 7.7 31 37 -6 6.4
Komeito 10.9 47 53 -6 9.7
Communists 6.8 14 33 -19 2.9
Other small parties 0.1 0 0 0 0.0
Independents 5.5 16 27 -11 3.3
Totals 100.0 486 486 _0 0.0
§9.4 Proportional Representation Systems
In proportional representation systems, the purpose of an
election is to produce as closely as possible a match between a
party's share of the votes and its share of representation in the
national parliament. Therefore, the necessary condition for
proportional representation systems is a multi-member
constituency. There are two types of proportional systems: list
systems and single transferable vote. Here I will discuss them
separately in the following.
§9.4.1 Type I: List Systems
List systems, are used by every continental European
democratic countries except France. It is another main type of
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proportional representation electoral systems. The European
countries modify this system into various forms by different ways
of designing list, allocation of seats and restrictions to the
elector's choice among candidates. In fact, list systems are of
many types. However, list system can be classified according to
three criteria: (1) Whether the list is national or sub-national
(i.e. regional or local); (2) whether the allocation of seats is
at national level or in multi-member constituencies in regional
or local level; (3) whether the system allows electors to choose
between different candidates of their preferred party (i.e.
flexible or open list), or even allow electors to choose across
parties (i.e. free list), or whether it confines electors to vote
for a party list with the order-of candidates being determined by
the party. I will discuss these criteria respectively bellow:
(1) National list systems are used only by Isreal and the
Netherlands. Isreal goes to the extreme accuracy in party
representation for the whole country is one constituency. In
Isreal each party presents a list of candidates in an order
decided by the party and votes are cast for the whole list. In
the Netherlands, constituencies do not determine how many seats
each party wins, they may determine which candidates fill the
party seats. Countries using national list allocate seats
proportionately at national level.
(2) Countries using regional or local constituencies
but allocating seats proportionately at the national level
include Germany, Denmark and Italy. National proportionality is
secured through the allocation of supplementary seats from a
national pool• Since a number of seats may be reserved in a
national pool and allocated to the under—represented parties,
this method can be used to correct the deviations from
proportionality caused by small district magnitudes.
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(3) List systems may or may not allow electors to choose
between candidates of the same party. Isreal is the country where
there is no choice at all. This type of list system is known as
the closed list system. Most countries allow some choice of
candidates, but this is often very limited. In Belgian, some
limited choice is allowed. Electors can either vote for the list
in which the order of candidates are decided by the party, or he
may vote for a particular candidate by marking the preferred
candidate's name on the list. This type is known as the flexible
list system. In Finland, electors can have a greater degree of
electoral choice. There is not an ordered list presented to
electors, instead, but a series of names in alphabetical order.
Electors are asked to mark a space beside the candidate they
choose. This is an example of the open list system. Finally,
there is a free list system in Switzerland and Luxembourg, where,
again the candidates are not put in any order of preference by
the parties. There, electors have not only one vote as the
case in Finland, but as many votes as there are candidates to be
elected. An elector may cast his votes for candidates of
different parties and cumulate two votes on any one candidate
if he wishes, this is a kind of approval voting in which
intensity of preference may be expressed. Although both the open
list and the free list systems enable an elector to rank order
candidates on the party list, they still share a basic feature
of list systems, that every vote (whether or not given in the
first instance to an individual candidate) is, automatically and
without further reference to the voter's wishes, added to the
total of the list on which that candidate appears. [7]
Therefore, elector's vote for one candidate on a party list may
help elect another candidate on the same list, whom the elector
might not support or even disapprove of. This situation can never
happen in a single transferable vote system, however, list
systems are likely to yield a greater degree of proportionality
than the single transferable vote, especially when allocation of
seats is at national level.q]
Proportional Representation Systems -118- Chapter Nine
§9-4-2 Type II: Single Transferable Vote
The ballot structure of the single transferable vote is
ordinal. It is a preferential electoral system in multi-member
constituencies. It has two features: First, it secures
proportional representation of political opinion. Second, it
enables electors to choose candidates within, as well as between
parties. Representation of opinion would be secure since it
ensure that the number of votes wasted is minimised and that as
many as possible electors are able to elect their
representatives. Gudgin and Taylor (1974) suggest, votes can
be classified into three categories according to their location:
(1) Wasted votes. These are the votes which bring no seats,
because they are cast to candidates or parties which
lose in constituencies.
(2) Excess votes. These are the votes also bring no seats,
because they are extra to the number needed to win the
constituencies in which it is successful.
(3) Effective votes. These are the votes which win seats,
and are calculated as one vote more than the total won
by the opposition. |-gj
In a plurality or majority systems, a constituency is won by
the candidate or party getting most votes. If there are two
parties contesting in a single-member constituency and there are
10,000 votes from the electorate, then 5,001 votes of the total,
which is the number of effective votes, will be sufficient for
victory; any more votes are excess, since they do not bring extra
seats for the party. On the other hand, if the party receives
fewer than 5,001 votes, these votes are wasted since they do not
bring representation. Therefore, the aim of the single
transferable vote is to attempt to minimize the number of wasted
and excess votes. In single transferable vote system, votes would
P0 secured not to be wasted simply because they would be
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transferred. (The only wasted votes would be those cast for the
runner-up and the voter had refused to indicate a full list of
preferences. This makes those non-transferable) In this system,
electors are asked to rank all candidates in order of
preferences, candidates have to obtain a certain number of votes
to be elected. In order to minimize wasted votes as possible, if
a candidate wins more votes than needed, the excess votes are
transferred to other candidates in proportion to the next lower
preferences recorded on each ballot paper cast to the elected
candidate. In this way, each elector would be represented by a
candidate of his choice. The single transferable vote has been
found to yield a high degree of proportionality, although not
higher than the list systems, qqi
SECTION IV
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CHAPTER TEN
A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In the present century, the most notable contribution to the
theory of elections was made by Kenneth Arrow. Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem shows that no existing deomcratic
electoral systems can simultaneously satisfy a small set of
reasonable democratic conditions. It means that electoral systems
can break Rule U, C, I, P and even Rule N.
In democratic countries worldwide, a wide variety of
electoral systems are being practised. In what sense are these
electoral systems unreasonable? What Arrow's conditions do these
systems violate? In order to find out the answer, I will examine
the plurality systems, two-ballot system, alternative vote
system, single non-transferable vote system, list proportional
representation systems and also the alternative vote system.
Although conditions other than Arrow's conditions have been
proposed, j- j the analyses performed here, are mainly on the
basis of Arrow's conditions.
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Plurality Electoral Systems
In a plurality system, each eligible voter has as many votes
as there are seats to be filled. Usually, only a single member is
elected in each constituency. Candidate x is a winner under the
plurality system if x obtains more votes than every other
candidates in an election, i.e. C(u, S)=[x: x e S and tvt,.m a y
for all y S]. Whenever there is a tie, it can be resolved by
some tie-breaking methods such as drawing lots. Plurality system
is a non-ranked system. Voters need not to rank candidates on
the ballot paper. Just a cross or a tick is enough for voters
making a choice. It is assumed that electors cast their votes
to a candidate of their first preference.
(1) Plurality system satisfies Rule U: For a non-paradox
preference profile, obviously plurality system can yield a chosen
set. Moreover, even in a paradox preference profile, it produces
a tie. Tie can be resolved by some tie-breaking methods.
(2) Plurality system violates Rule C: Consider the preference
profile: uR-jy R2 R3] where R1=xwyz, R2=ywzx,
R3=zxyw, and X=[x, y, z, w]. According to the definition of
social choice function stipulated in Rule C, a social choice
is consistent if x£ C(u, [x, y]) and y .C(u, [y, z]) then
xeC(u, [x, y]). However, in our case we have [z]=C(u, [z, x]),
[w]=C(u, [x, w]) and [w]=C(u, [z, w]). This violates the Rule C.
(3) Plurality system satisfies Rule P: Since when all
individuals prefer x to y, y can not be the one who obtains most
votes and hence cannot be the winner.
(4) Plurality system satisfies Rule I: Let us consider
two preference profiles, u=[xyz, yzx, zxy] and u'-[xyz, xyz, zxy]
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where X=[x, y, z], For a choice environment S=[x, y], us=[xy,
yx, xy] and u's=[xy, yx, xy] Since, RS=R'and also
C(u, [xy])= C(u', [xy])= [x]. Therefore, plurality system
satisfies the Rule I.
(5) Plurality system satisfies Rule N: It is because no single
individual's choice can become society's choice. A candidate
emerges as a winner only when he is preferred by most of the
voters. Therefore, plurality system garantee the Nondictatorship
condition.
Plurality system can produce an extremely weak
representation when there are many candidates. Consider the case
with four candidates and 40,000 voters:
Voter group A (11,000) xPyPzPw
Voter group B (10,000) yP.
Voter group C (10,000) yP.
Voter group D( 9,000) wyzx
In plurality system, candidate x will be elected with 11,000
first-preference votes, candidates y, z and w will be rejected
with 10,000, 10,000 and 9,000 votes respectively. The elected
candidate does not have majority support. In fact, only 11, 000
out of total 40,000 votes prefers candidate x and is then
declared to be elected even though the majority, 29,000 votes
ranks x as the last in their preference. Moreover, the total
wasted votes is up to 34 of the total votes.
The wasted votes phenomenon indeed have psychological effect
on voter's behaviour. A voter, whose favorite seems no chance of
winning, may vote strategically for another candidate he
approves of who has a better chance. For example, the
popular-vote percentages in the 1980 presidential election in the
United States were 51 for Ronald Regan, 41 for Jimmy Carter,
and 7 for John Anderson. Brams and Fishburn (1982), using
available data from several sources, have estimated that if the
same voters had voted their true preferences, then the
percentages would have been about 40 for Regan, 35 for Carter,
and 24 for Anderson. More than 70% of those who favored Anderson
voted for either Reagan or Carter. Thus the wasted votes
phenomenon induced voters to vote for two promising candidates
and turned the election into a two-candidate race between
Reagan and Carter.[2]
In addition, since the number of votes required to win
cannot be known in advance, the plurality system has been
frequently blamed for not reflecting in the elected candidates
the various opinions of the electorate.
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Two-Ballot System
By using only first place preferences, plurality system does
not take into account the information about the preferences of
voters. It may select a candidate who is ranked the last by the
majority. In order to overcome this deficiency, a double ballot
system is introduced. In the two-ballot system, which is normally
restricted to single-member constituencies, a second round of
election is held if no candidate gains more than 50 per cent of
the votes cast in the first ballot. In the second ballot,
normally only two leading candidates are admitted. It has been
the system used most frequently in France in parliamentary
elections until 1986. In presidential elections, two-ballot
system is directly used to elect their presidents in Australia,
Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and France, j-3 j
A majority winner is that the winning candidate or the
winning party has defeated the entire field of opposition; no
combination of opponents can match its numerical strength. If
Party A has a majority, then:
Thus, the chosen set for the first ballot can be defined as:
For the second ballot, plurality electoral rule is in use.
If there are exactly two candidates, the plurality voting rule
makes the same choice as simple majority rule.
(1) Two-ballot system satisfies Rule U: It responses to all
logically combination of preference orderings of individuals. Tie
is resolved by some tie-breaking methods.
(2) Two-ballot system violates Rule C: Two-ballot system is
inconsistent as can be seen from the following case, where
X=[x, y, z], u=[Rp R2... R;qL in which R-zyx, R2 and
R3rrxyz, R to R6=yzx, R7=yxz, Rg and Rg=zxy, R1Q and Rl;L=xyz.
The effective votes for being a majority winner are 6. We can see
that C(u, [x, y])=[x], C(u, [y, z])=[y] but C(u, [x, z])=[z].
This violates Rule C in the first ballot.
In this two stages choice procedure, assuming only two
leading candidates can remain in the second ballot. Also, voters
will vote according to their ordering of candidates. Since in the
first ballot no majority winner emerges, candidate z will be
eliminated. In the second ballot, candidate y will win x by 6 to
5 votes, i.e. C(u, S)=[y]. However, if S'=[x, z], the chosen set
becomes: C(u, S')=[z]. Since C(u, S)t£C(u, S'). It also violates
Rule C.
(3) Two-ballot system satisfies Rule P: The reason is the same as
the plurality system. Since when all individuals prefer x to y,
y cannot be the one who obtains majority of votes.
(4) Two-ballot system satisfies Rule I: Two-ballot system only
considers candidates within the choice environment, therefore no
irrelevant alternatives can affect the choice outcomes. (Rule I
will be violated only when the voting procedure will take the
alternatives outside the choice environment into consideration.)
(5) Two-ballot system satisfies Rule N: It is because two-ballot
system only yields a unique winner, therefore no candidates can
be elected only by a single individual's preference.
Two-ballot system fails the same test as the plurality
system. However, it is better than plurality system because
it guarantees the winner is the one who will not be ranked last
by most of the voters.
Alternative Vote System
The alternative vote system is a true majority system. In
which voters are asked to indicate their first preference, second
preference, and so on among candidates. Voter's vote will be
transferred to his next preferred candidate if his favourite
were defeated. This system on the one hand solves the wasted
votes problem in the plurality system, on the other hand it
secures an absolute majority winner in a single ballot. It is
also more easier to implement than the two-ballot
system.
The alternative vote system is currently used in Australia.
The present situation [1986] is that the lower houses
of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and
Western Australia; the federal House of Representatives; and the
Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory are elected from
single-member districts by majority-preferential methods,
[alternative vote methods] The upper houses (Legislative
Councils) of Victoria and Western Australia are elected from
two-member provinces with overlapping-term provisions so that in
effect, a single-member-district system applies. The Legislative
Council of Tasmania is elected from single-member districts by a
majority-preferential method. The House of Assembly of Tasmania,
the Legislative Councils of New South Wales and South Australia,
and the federal Senate are elected by quota-preferential methods,
[single transferable methods] Thus, 10 of the 14 parliamentary
bodies are elected by majority-preferential methods and 4 by
quota-preferential methods [5]





4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
x y z y x w
Y x y w W x
w w w z z z
z z x x y y
Since no candidate obtains a majority of first place votes,
we eliminate w: the candidate with the lowest number of first
preferences. The preference orderings become:
4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
x y z y x x
y x y z z z
z z x x y y
There is still no majority winner, and elimination procedure
is repeated by excluding candidate z. Now the preference orderings
become:
4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
x y y y x x
y x x x y y
Candidate y beats x by 11 to 10 votes and hence is the
maiority winner in the alternative vote system.
(1) Alternative vote system satisfies Rule U: It responses to all
logically combination of preference orderings of individuals.
(2) Alternative vote system violates Rule C: Alternative vote
system is a multi-stage voting procedure. From the above example,
we obtain C(u, S)=[y], where S=[x, y, z, w]. However, when
S'=[y, z], the preference orderings become:
4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
Y Y z y z z
Z z y z y y
The chosen set: C(u, S') is [z] since z beats y by 11 to
10 votes. For y€S'CS and C(u, S)=[y], but C(u, S')=[z]. Thus,
we may conclude that alternative vote system is inconsistent.
(3) Alternative vote system satisfies Rule P: Alternative vote
method is based on the number of first ranks given to various
candidates by voters and also its chosen set is unique. It
guarantees that if everyone unanimously prefers one candidate,
say x, to another, say y, then y would not be the winner.
(4) Alternative vote system satisfies Rule I: Alternative vote
system only considers candidates inside the choice environment,
thus no irrelevant alternatives have to worry about.
(5) Alternative vote system satisfies Rule N: Alternative vote
system always yields a majority winner, therefore, no single
individual's favourite can emerge in the chosen set.
The problem of alternative vote system, just the same as all
other plurality and majority systems, is that it yields
disproportionate electoral outcomes.[6j
Single Non-transferable Vote System
This system is currently practised in Japan in
national-level elections of the House of Representatives. Most of
the districts in Japan are three-member, four-member and five
member districts. At present, there are 130 constituencies
throughout Japan, all except one are multi-member constituencies.
Of the 511 representatives, 510 are elected by single
non-transferable vote system (SNTV); one is elected in a
single-member constituency, whch is in fact a plurality instead
of a SNTV.[7j
SNTV is a special case of the limited vote in which each
voter has only one vote in a multi-member constituency. SNTV is
different from plurality and majority systems in two aspects.
First, the plurality and majority systems normally are applied in
single-member constituencies whereas the SNTV requires
multi-member constituencies. Second, SNTV facilitates minority
representation. This effect, however, cannot be achieved by
either plurality or majority systems.
The SNTV achieves minority representation can be explained
in terms of its electoral threshold. According to Rae, Hanby, and
Loosemore (1971), there are two types of threshold: the threshold
of representation and the threshold of exclusion. The threshold
of exclusion is the percentage of the vote that will guarantee
the winning of a seat even under the most unfavorable situation.
For example, the most unfavorable situation for a minority party
to face in a four-member constituency is that one large majority
party with four candidates who each receive exactly equal shares
of the total votes in relative high proportions, however, if the
this minority party has only one candidate who receives slightly
more than twenty percent of the votes, the candidate from this
minority party is assured of a seat in the election. It is
possible that a minority party wins a seat with fewer votes than
the threshold of exclusion. The threshold of representation is
the vote percentage that may be sufficient for a party to win a
seat under the most favorable' conditions. For instance, if the
majority of votes gained by a large party concentrates to a
single major candidate, the other two candidates can be elected
with less votes than the threshold of exclusion. Minority parties
thus can gain seats when conditions are favorable to them.
Single non-transferable vote system, in fact, is the
application of the plurality method in single-member
constituencies to multi-member constituencies. The ballot
structure for both SNTV and the first-past-the-post systems are
the same. However, the chosen set in SNTV is not a single winner,
instead, the size of the chosen set depends on the magnitude of
an electoral district. Normally, it ranges from three to five.
SNTV system can be defined as:
for district magnitude= i];
(1) SNTV system satisfies Rule U: It is because SNTV responses
to all logically combination of preference orderings of voters.
(2) SNTV system violates Rule C: the reason for this is just the
same as the plurality system. It can be seen from the following
case, where X=[x, y, z], u=[R, R2, R3] in which R=xyzw,
R2=ywzx, R2=zxyw. We can show that for a three—member
constituency, C(u, [z, x])=[z], C(u, [x, w])=[w]; But we find
that C(u, [z, w])=[w]. This violates Rule C
(3) SNTV system satisfies Rule P: It is obvious since when all
individuals prefer x to y, y gains no vote and therefore will not
be elected.
(4) SNTV system satisfies Rule Is SNTV system only considers
candidates within the choice environment. Therefore, no
irrelevant alternatives can affect the choice outcomes.
(5) SNTV system violates Rule N: Suppose in a two-member
constituency, where X=[x, y, z, w], u=[R, R2, R3 R4L in which
R-L=xyzw, R2=xzyw, R=xwyz and R=wxzy. We obtain C(u, S)= [x], and
also all individuals prefer x to w except individual 4. However,
w€C(u, S). Thus, individual 4 is a dictator.
Although SNTV can yield a higher proportional result, it
cannot solve the wasted votes problems. The representation of an
elected candidate can be quite low. Moreover, it does not seem to
have much improvement for plurality and majority systems.
List Proportional Representation Systems
The Principle of this type of electoral systems are to
allocate seats to any party in the legislature as closely as
possible to the share of the votes which it has won. Ideally, the
share of the total seats should be in direct proportional to the
share of the total votes.
The principle of proportionate share can be defined as:
S= fc[8]
For example, in a constituency with 42 million voters
electing a legislature of 100 members, the ideal distribution of
seats corresponding to votes for parties will be:
Pure proportional representation
Millions of voters% share of vote No. of seats
Party x: 12 28.6 29
z: 11 26.2 26
y: 10 23.8 24
w: 9 21.4 21
42 100.0 100 jgj
Since seats are distributed proportional to the distribution
of votes, so this requires more than one vacancy, and multimember
constituencies are necessary.
The list systems are used in majority of democractic
countries, (eg. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Isreal,' Italy)
There are some variations in list systems, but they are basically
the same that the parties nominate lists of candidates in
multimember constituencies, voters cast their ballots for one
party list or the other. Seats are allocated to the party lists
in proportion to the share of votes that party have obtained.
List systems may be subdivided further according to the
mathematical formula used to translate votes into seats. The
subcategories are the Largest Remainder and the Highest Average
Methods.
§10.5.1 The Largest Remainder List System
The largest remainder method is the simplest means of
allocation. It begins with the computation of a quota, by which a
party must achieve for granting a seat. The most commonly used
quota is the Hare quota, which is defined as:
V
Hare quota (q)= M
(q) is equal to the number of votes cast divided by the
number of seats assigned to the district.
In the case of a four-member constituency where 20,000 votes
have been cast, the Hare quota will be 20,0004, which is equal
to 5,000 votes.
Case 1; Four-member Constituency, 20,000 votes cast.j--q]
Hare quota: 5,000 votes
Party Votes Quota Seats Remainder Seats Total Seats
A 8,200 5,000 1 32,00 1 2
B 6,100 5,000 1 1,100 0 1
C 3,000- 0 3,000 1 1
D 2,700- 0 2,700 0 0
Total 20,000 2 2 4
In the above case, only two of the four parties achieve the
quota. Therefore, only two of the four seats can be directly
allocated; one to party A and the other to party B. Under the
largest remainder system, the third seat goes to party A and the
fourth seat to party C. Hence, the largest remainder system is
favourable to smaller parties. It should be noticed that party C
gets as many seats as party B while getting less than half of B's
total votes.
§10.5.2 The Highest Average List System:
The highest average system is commonly known as the D'Hont
rule, named after its inventor. Its central idea is to divide
each party's votes by successive divisors, the D'Hondt divisors:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., and then allocate the seats to the parties
in descending order of quotients. The purpose is to secure that
when all the seats have been allocated, the average number of
votes required to win one seat is as nearly as possible the same
for each party. Let us use the same electoral results in the
previous case to illustrate this system:
Case 2; Four-member Constituency, 20,000 votes cast.|-
Division by D'Hondt divisors
Party Votes Divisor si Divisor: 2 Divisor; 3 Total Seats
A 8,200 8,200(1) 4,100(3) 2,733 2
B 6,100 6,100(2) 3,050(4) 2,033 2
C 3,000 3,000 1,500 1,000 0
D 2,700 2,700 1,350 900 0
Total 20,000 4
We can see that under the D'Hondt system the allocation of
seats is different from that of Largest remainder system. The
first seat is allocated to party A, the second to party B, the
third to party A and the fourth to party B. Party C and D are
left without seat. D'hondt system is unfavorable to smaller
parties. For a smaller party, the remainder for a seat will be a
Liqber proportion of its total votes, and therefore will be more
costly to it.
In view of this unfairness an alternative divisors, the
Sainte-Lague divisors has been adopted in several Scandinavian
countries. The Sainte-Lague divisors involves dividing each
party's votes by 1.4, 3, 5, 7, etc., instead of by 1, 2, 3, 4,
etc. The Sainte-Lague divisors differs from the D'Hondt method in
two ways: (1) the first divisor is larger by 40%, and (2) the
relative distances between the number of the series are larger.
In the case of the distance between the second and the third
divisors, the difference between Lague and D'Hondt are:
Lague: 3 to 5. (5-3=2) relative distance=25= 0.40
D'Hondt: 2 to 3. (3-2=1) relative distance=l3= 0.33
The Sainte-Lague method is in favor of medium-sized parties
by lowering the advantage obtained under D'Hondt procedures by 1
the largest party and by raising the threshold at which small
parties begin to win seats, (notice that the first divisor is 1.4
instead of 1.)
The largest remainder and the highest average system are not
mutually exclusive. It is possible to combine both methods by
first using Hare quota for direct allocation of seats and than
allocating the remaining seats by D'Hondt method or Saint-Lague
method. The selection of electoral formula is based on whether
greater or lesser advantage should be given to large, small or
medium-sized parties.
In party list systems, only voters' first preferences are
counted, the choice for voters, therefore must refer to political
parties, or precisely to the candidate list of political parties.
Although there are many ways of allocating seats to candidates
within a party (eg. closed list, flexible list, open list),
voters are fundamentally voting for a party list.
For our convenience, let us consider voters normally vote
for parties, not candidates. If we examine the preference profile
of individuals over parties, we will find that an intransitive
social ordering by pairwise comparison of parties may occur.
Recalling the previous example for a pure proportional
representation, we try to take individuals' preference pattern
into consideration this time:
Pure proportional representation
Group Voting Millions of voters% share of vote No. of seats
A xWy 12 28 6 29
B zP¥PyPx 11 262 26
C „PPYP1T 10 23.8 24y z x w
D yPyPxPz 0 21.4 21
42 100.0 100
(1) Party list systems violate Rule C: From the above preference
profile, we obtain C(u, [x, y])=[x], C(u, [y, z])=[y, z]. By
social transitivity, we yield C(u, [x, z])= [x]. However,
we also obtain C(u, [x, z])=[z]. This violates the Rule C.
The incositency can also be explained in terms of social
ordering. We have (12+11+9) votes for xPy—(1) egual votes
(12+10) for y and z, i.e. yIz—(2). From (1) and (2), we get
. But (11+10+9) votes prefer ZPX. We thus obtain both
the social orderings XPZ and ZPX. An intransitive social
ordering is resulted.
(2) Party list systems satisfy Rule U: Party list systems
response to all combination of individual's preferences; even in
a paradox preference profile it produces a winner, (as in the case
illustrated above, it produces a winner: C(u, [x, y, z])=[x])
(3) Party list systems satisfy Rule I: Since only alternatives
within the choice environment are taken into consideration, no
irrelevant alternatives outside the choice environment can affect
the election outcomes.
(4) Party list systems satisfy Rule P: Unanimity here would mean
one party winning all the seats. This case is guaranteed in party
list systems for they respond accurately to the proportion of
votes received by a party.
(5) Party list systems satisfy Rule N: Normally, in party list
systems a threshold is imposed in order to prevent small parties
too easy to win a seat with relatively low percentage of total
votes. This measure effectively prohibits any single voter
becomes a 'dictator'.
Single Transferable Vote System
Party list systems stand up well in responding to
the diversity of voters opinion for they distribute seats
available in a multimember-constituency among the parties
in approximate proportion to the votes cast for the party lists.
However, candidate's chance of being elected depends
overwhelmingly on hisher party's strength in that constituency
and hisher position in the party list rather on voter's opinion
or knowledge about himher. In party list systems, voters are
asked to vote for a party list, that all of the candidates of
the party heshe chooses are presumed to be better than all
candidates in other parties. Voters' support to a party may help
to elect some other candidates that he does not like. Single
transferable vote system, allows voters a much larger choice of
individual candidates among parties, is considered as a remedy
for the disadvantages of list systems,
STVS is currently practised in the Republic of Ireland.
Since the constituencies are normally relatively small
(3-5 members), it yields a less proportional results than most
party list systems.
The STVS is an extension of the alternative vote system.
STVS is designed to select more than one candidate from each
constituency, while in alternative vote system only a single
winner emerges. In this sense, the example used to demostrate the
inconsistency of the alternative vote system can also be used to
show the inconsistency of the STVS.
Before we analysis STVS in terms of Arrow's condition, we
will give a brief description of how the STVS operates:
1. Voters are required to cast their votes in terms of their
preference order among the candidates: first choice, second
choice, third choice, etc.
2. The ballot papers are sorted and counted according to first
preferences. Candidate will win a seat if he or she received
enough first choice votes to pass a prescribed quota. This quota,
known as the Droop Quota, can be stated as:
Total votes (V)
Droop Quota (Q)= Total seats (M)+ 1 [15]
3. If no candidate received enough first place votes, or if
some seats remained to be filled, then second place choices are
counted and transferred to those candidates who need them to
attain the quota. This transfer is conducted from the top—from
candidates who passed the quota with more first place votes than
needed. If such surplus votes do not exist, the transfer then
takes place at the bottom—from candidates who received the least
first place votes.
In the former case, the vote awarded to another candidate is
equal to: elected candidate surplus second preferences
X for the unelected
total vote for elected candidate candidate
[16]
These votes are awarded at the discount way outlined in the
formula above to the remaining candidates.
In the latter case, second place preferences are transferred
with full weight.
The following example, which demonstrates the inconsistency
of the alternative vote system, also shows that STVS is
inconsistent.
Assumme we have: S=[x, y, z, w], u=[Rp R2,... R21].
4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
x y z y x w
y x y w w x
w w w z z z
z z x x y y
The 21 voters in the district distributed and rank their
preferences among the candidates as shown in the table above.
In order to computed a winner, the first step is to find the
Droop Quota: total votes (V) =21
total seats (M)= 2
21
Q= 2+1+ 1= 8
Any candidate with 8 votes is elected.
1st count: first preferences:
Candidate x is elected. Transfer x's 1 surplus vote, (y gets
49 vote, w gets 59 vote.)
2nd count: first and x's second preferences:
No candidate is elected. Elimination of w and transfer of
his votes. (1 votes goes to z. The 59 vote, is originally
awarded from x, which cannot be transferred further, it is
regarded as the exhausted vote.)
3rd count: first preferences, x's second preferences and w's
third preferences.
z is eliminated, y is elected.
Result: x and z is elected, i.e. C(u, S)=[x, y]
(1) STVS violates Rule C: When S'= [y, z], voters preference
orderinqs become
4 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 3 Voters 5 Voters 1 Voters
y y z y z z
z z y z y y
Therefore, C(u, [x, y])=[z].
Since y£C(u, S) but y$£C(u, [y, z]), we thus conclude that
the STVS is inconsistent.
(2) STVS satisfies Rule U: Just the same as the alternative vote
system, it responses to all logically combination of preference
orderings of individuals.
(3) STVS satisfies Rule P: STVS is based on the ranking given to
various candidates by voters. If all individuals prefer x to y
and x is available, the STVS certainly ranks x higher than y.
Among x and y, x is selected instead of y.
(4) STVS satisfies Rule I: STVS only considers candidates inside
the choice environment, therefore, it satisfies Rule I.
(5) STVS satisfies Rule N: STVS always yields a majority winner,
therefore, no single individual's favourite can emerge in the
rhn.qpn ppt-..
The STVS may have many merits not found in other systems,
however, due to its inconsistency, it is possible that [a]
candidate can win in each district separately, yet lose the
general election in the combined districts.
CONCLUSION
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a demonstration of the
inconsistency among his conditions. The proof of the theorem
employs a particular preference profile which produces a cyclical
majority to show that condition I to IV lead to a contradiction
of the nondictatorship condition. In part one of section I, I
have demonstrated that if an individual is decisive for any pair
of alternatives, then the individual is a dictator over any
number of alternatives in the same set. In part two of section I,
I have shown that the dictator, in fact, exists. In section II,
the result obtained in section I is generalized and applied to
any finite number of alternatives and any number of individuals.
Thus, Arrow's theorem holds for any number of individuals and
alternatives greater than or equal to three. It should be noticed
that Arrow's paradox occurs only for a particular pattern of
preferences profiles, not for all preference profiles. Moreover,
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a logical result, not the result
of empirical observation. Arrow examined, not particular systems,
but a fully general, abstract system. Therefore, we need not to
examine various systems of social choice, such as majority rule,
proportional representation systems, we will know for certain
that all systems having the same impossibility result as the
abstract one.
The proof of Arrow's theorem is valid, therefore the
assessment of Arrow's theorem focuses on various conditions that
Arrow imposes on the social welfare function.
From the analysis of Arrow's conditions, we found that they
are not the requirement of rationality, actually they represent a
particular form of democratic believes—the populistic democratic
theory.
In the discussion of the probability of Arrow's paradox, we
can see that the probability varied according to different
assumptions. In an impartial culture, under the assumption of
equiprobability, the probability of paradox is relatively low.
However, if we consider certain probability vector of preference
profiles for a partial culture, the probability of paradox can be
much higher. Nevertheless, with a suitable restriction on a
preference profiles, the paradox would disappear.
Arrow• s paradox can be avoided by restriction on the
Condition of Unrestricted Domain. The restrictions which we have
discussed were Black's single-peakedness and Sen's value
restrictedness. However, such restrictions can avoid Arrow's
paradox but do not solve it. We cannot infringe Arrow's
conditions merely to avoid paradox. One of the attempt to justify
the infringement of the Unrestricted Domain is proposed by
Mackay. He argued that the restriction on the admission of
preference profiles is analogues to the imposition of a starting
point to block an infinite regress. Mackay's approach, as I have
pointed out, is ethically problematic. It may not be an
acceptable way of handling Arrow's problem.
Arrow has argued that aggregation of individual preferences
must only base on ordering of preferences. The intensity of
preference should not be allowed. The reasons are that the
cardinal utility scale violates the condition of independence of
irrelevant alternatives and also is meaningless. However, We
'discover' that Arrow is mistaken to think that cardinal utility
scale violates the condition of independence of irrelevant
alternatives. We also show that the notion of 'lottery' in
constructing a cardinal-utility indicator is possible. Moreover,
money can also be used as a basis for interpersonal comparison.
The Preference Revealing Process is a true preference inducing
method which can be employed to prevent strategic manipulation in
cardinal utility scale. Thus, cardinal utility scale is
acceptable in certain situations. However, it cannot solve the
problem of Arrow's paradox completely. Although the cardinal
utility scale can reduce the occurance of the paradox, it cannot
eliminate it.
The Pareto Principle is a reiteration of the condition of
positive association of individual and social values and the
condition of citizens' sovereignty. Pareto Principle is implied
from the notion of 'social choice'. If a choice is unanimously
preferred by everyone in the society without exception, the
choice must be a social choice. Therefore, the Pareto Principle
is a necessary condition for social choice mechanisms. Gordon
Tullock and James Buchanan suggested a unanimity rule as a
necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice mechanism.
However, our analysis show that both theoretical and practical
problems are associated with the unanimity rule.
Strasnick has suggested that the violation of Arrow's
Nondictatorship Principle may be morally justified. Strasnick
argued that individuals should not be treated equally in
determining a social choice, the preference of the least
advantaged individuals should be given priority. The major
problem of Strasnick's theory is that the choice of a single
individual is not a social choice at all.
We have shown that the Axiom of transitivity can be derived
from the Axiom of connectivity. It means, axiom II is not an
axiom but a theorem only. The requirement of transitivity is
central to Arrow's conception of rationality. However,
transitivity may not be a necessary condition for rationality at
both individual and group levels. At the individual level, when
choice involves probabilistic thinking, violation of the
transitivity should not be considered as irrational. At the group
level, the violation of the social transitivity can be justified
by populistic democractic theory. In a paradoxical situation, we
can simply declare all alternatives are indifferent and proceed a
successive voting, or we can solve the paradox by some
randomizing methods.
Arrow's conditions, are a set of rules for a social welfare
function, which is different from a social choice function. Hence
Arrow's conditions have to reformulated so that they can be
applied to a social choice function. Electoral systems are a kind
of social choice function. The analysis of electoral systems are
based on the reformulated version of Arrow's conditions. It has
found that among the six major types of electoral systems: the
plurality systems, two-ballot system, alternative vote system,
single non-transferable vote system, list systems and the single
transferable vote system. All of them violate Rule C. The single
non-transferable vote system even violates Rule N. Since we have
already argued that the infringement of the Nondictatorship
Condition is unjustified, therefore, the single non-transferable
vote system is not a reasonable social choice mechanism. Although
the violation of Rule C can be justified. However some measures
must be taken whenever there is a paradoxical or inconsistent
preference profiles. A common method to overcome Arrow's problem
is to vote repeatedly until a transitive social outcomes are
obtained. Another way to settle the paradox is to use a
randomizing method. In the categorical type of ballot systems,
since voters only vote for their first choice, it is difficult to
identify a paradox. However, whenever there is a paradox, it will
appear as a tie votes. (It is because every candidates receive
exactly equal votes of first preference from voters.) Therefore,
tie-breaking method is used to solve a paradox.
We can see that all electoral systems except single
non-transferable vote violate only Rule C and satisfy the rest of
Arrow's conditions. Their electoral consequences are diverse.
Among these various electoral systems, the selection of them
cannot merely base on Arrow's conditions. It should remember that
Arrow's conditions are the minimum conditions for a rational
aggregation device. Therefore, additional criteria should be used
in the selection of an electoral system, such as the degree of
proportionality, the acceptability among the political parties
etc. However, the investigation of these criteria are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
APPENDIX:
The Preferential Elimination System of Voting
This system is recently adopted in the 1988 Legislative
Council elections in Hong Kong for both the functional
constituencies and the electoral college. As explained in the
Green Paper, this system has advantages over the 'preferential
addition' system used in the 1985 functional constituency
elections, because it gives greater priority to higher
preferences than to lower ones and does not carry the risk that
the candidate with the fewest first preference votes might
nevertheless win the election. It also has an advantage over the
repeated ballot system used in the 1985 electoral college
elections in that it involves only one round of voting,
The electoral system proposed in the White Paper is
basically the same type of the alternative vote system. The
operation of this system is illustrated by examples given in the
appendix C of the White Paper. This system is to ensure the
elected one must be an absolute majority winner through the
process of deletion of a defeated candidate and transfers of his
or her votes to the remaining candidates.
Suppose an election is held in a single-constituency, there
are 500 electors and with four candidates: A, B, C, D. In the
first count of voting, first preference votes among candidates
are as follows:
A: 90 B: 180 C: 120 D: 110 Total: 500
Since no candidate obtains a majority of first place votes,
candidate A, the one with least first place votes, is eliminated.
Votes cast to A are transferred according to the second
preference recorded on these ballot papers. Suppose the
distribution of votes are:
B: 39 C: 28 D: 19 Nil: 4 (exhausted) j-3 j Total: 90
Exhausted votes will not be counted in the total number of
valid votes. Those votes have second preference recorded will be
transferred. Therefore, the results of the second round of vote
counting will be:
B: 219(180+39) C: 148 (120+28) D: 129 (110+19) Total: 496
Again no majority winner emerges, the elimination process
continues, at this stage, candidate D is eliminated.
D's votes will be transferred according to their second
preferences:
B:59 C:18 A:30 (exhausted) Nil:3 (exhausted) Total: 110
30 votes for candidate A is set aside as an exhausted votes,
since candidate A has been eliminated. (This is different from
that of alternative vote, in which the third preferences of those
votes will be counted and be transferred.)
19 votes origninally transferred to D from A are
redistributed according to the third preferences recorded on
them. Suppose the third preferences recorded on these ballot
papers are:
B: 10 C: 9 Total: 19
The result of the third round of vote counting is:
B: 288 (219+59+10) C: 175 (148+18+9) Total: 463
The above election result can be put in a table as shown
below:


















Valid Votes 500 496 463
Quota (Q) 251 248 232
We should notice that the difference between the alternative
vote system and this preferential elimination system is that in
former system, all transferable votes will be counted, but in
preferential elimination system those votes cast to an eliminated
candidate will not be counted even though these votes are
hran.qf erabl e.
The defects of this system is; suppose A is eliminated first
and then D, votes recorded preferences as D, A, C, B will be
eliminated while votes recorded preferences as A, D, C, B will be
counted. Both D and A are eliminated, but the order of them will
affect the validity of the votes. This is unfair to both
candidate C and electors who votes with the preference D, A,
C, B.
Suppose that the votes recorded preferences as D, A, C, B and
D, A, B, C are transferable, the election result will be altered
when more than 22 votes out of 30 are recorded candidate C as the
third preference. Moreover, this measure may lead to a drastic
decrease of percentage of valid votes to total votes. Consider the
following case:
Candidate
A B C D





Since no majority winner emerges, A is eliminated. Suppose
that the second preferences shown on these 110 votes are as
follows:







The result of second round of counting becomes:
Candidate
A B C D










Again no candidate obtains an absolute majority, candidate B
is eliminated. Suppose that all the 120 votes cast to candidate B
are recorded A as their second preferences. According to the rules
of the preferential elimination system, these votes will be set
aside as an exhausted vote. It means, 120 out of the total 500
votes is eliminated. The eliminated votes consist of 24% of
the total.
If two candidates obtain equal votes, the preferential
elimination system suggests that the number of votes cast A as
first and B as second preference is added to B. Similarly, votes
cast B as first and A as second preference is added to A. The two
sum are compared and the one obtains less votes is eliminated.
However, this tie-breaking mechanism does not always work.
When the two sums thus obtained are the same, there is no further
method mentioned in this system are available to solve the tie
vote. It means, this system cannot respond to certain preference
profiles and therefore violates Rule U.
Since the preferential elimination system is basically the
same as the alternative vote system, therefore, the results
obtained from the alternative vote system can also be applied
here. It is concluded that the preferential elimination system
violates Rule U and C, while satisfies Rule P, I and N.
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6. Example is from Lakeman, p.86.
7. See Lakeman, p.110.
8. See Lakeman's Appendix II: Examples of Elections under
Proportional Systems; pp.281, 286. And also Arend
Lijphart's book, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and
Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, Yale
University Press, 1984; pp.160, 165.
9. See Gudgin, G. and Taylor, P.J., Electoral bias and the
distribution of party voters, Transactions, Institute of
British Geographers, 63 (1974), pp.53, 73.
10. See the section: Accuracy of Representation of the chapter
VI: The Single Transferable Vote from Lakeman's book, How
Democracies Vote: A study of Electoral Systems, 4th edition,
London, 1974; pp.125, 128; and also see its Appendix II:
Examples of Elections under Proportional Systems; pp.281,
286.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 10
1. Besides Arrow's conditions, many scholars have proposed
other social choice conditions for a social choice choice
function. These conditions embody notions such as fairness,
equity and consistency. Examples are: Anonymity, Neutrality,
Rbnotonicity and Partition Consistency. See Sen, A.K.,
Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Hoiden-Day, San
Francisco, 1970; chapters 3, 5, 9 and 9'.
2.. See Brams, S. J. and P.C. Fishburn, Deducing Preferences
and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election, Electoral
Studies, 1 (1982); PP.333, 346. And also see P.C. Fishburn,
Social Choice and Pluralitylike Electoral Systems. In
Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Electoral Laws
and Their Political Consequences, Agathon Press Inc., New
York; pp.193, 202.
3. See Dick Leonard and Richard Natkiel, The Economist World
Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies,
Hodder and Stoughton, 1987; p.2.
4. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws, revised edition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971; p.24.
5. See Jack F. H. Wright, Australian Experience with
Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems. In
Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Electoral Laws
and Their Political Consequences, Agathon Press Inc., New
York; pp.126, 127.
6. Jack F. H. Wright points out that [i]n earlier elections,
there have been cases where majorities of seats have been
won by parties with only minority support from the voters.
In the House of Representatives election of 1954, the Labour
party received over 50% of first preferences, but the
Liberal-Country party coalition won a majority preferred to
the coalition by more than half the voters, but on each
occasion it failed to win half the seats in the House. There
have also been elections of state houses which have given
results of this kind. An example is the election of the
House of Assembly of South Australia in 1968, when Labour
candidates received 51.98% of the first preferences but the
party won only 19 of the 39 seats. ibid, pp.128, 129.
7. See Arend Liphart, Rajael Lopez Pintor, and Yasunori Sone,
The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote:
Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples. In
Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Electoral Laws
and Their Political Consequences, Agathon Press Inc., New
York; pp.154, 169.
8. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws, revised edition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971; p.28.
9. Example is from John Bonner's book, Introduction to the
Theory of Social Choice, The John Hopkins University Press,
1986; p.91.
10. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
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Laws, revised edition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971; p.34.
11. Example is from Dick Leonard and Richard Natkiel's book, The
Economist World Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39
Democracies, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987; p.2.
12. ibid., p.3.
13. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws, revised edition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971; p.33.
14. George H. Hallet is one of the strong STVS advocates, he
presents his reasons in his article, Proportional
Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic
Reguirement for Legislative Elections. In Lijphart and
Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and
Alternatives, 1984; pp.113, 125.
15. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws, revised edition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971; p.36.
16. ibid., p.37.
17. See Fishburn, P. C., and S. J. Brams, Paradoxes of
preferential voting, Mathematics Maqizine 56 (1983)
p.207. Fishburn identifies this case as Multiple-Districts
Paradox. It violates the partition consistency proposed by
Young. (P. H. Young, An Axiomatization of the Borda Rule,
Journal of Economic Theory, 9 (1974), pp.43, 52.) The
desirability of this consistency requirement for democracy
can be reasoned as follows: one would presumably expect that
a candidate winning in two separate districts would also be
the winner when a combined score of the two districts was
calculated, given that the preferences of the voters in the
two districts remained identical in the enlarged one.
Clearly if one receives most of the votes in two separate
groups, he or she should also receive most of the votes from
the combined group. In this sense, a electoral system that
fails to meet this condition may be considered as
inconsistent.
NOTES FOR APPENDIX
1. See White Paper: The Development of Representative
Government: The Way Forward, February 1988, Printed by the
Government Printer, Hong Kong; pp.20, 21.
2. ibid., Appendix C, Example B; pp.26, 28.
3. Exhausted votes are those votes fail to record the next
preference. Thus, votes are not transferable.
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